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ABSTRACT  
   
Consideration of both biological and human-use dynamics in coupled social-ecological 
systems is essential for the success of interventions such as marine reserves. As purely 
human institutions, marine reserves have no direct effects on ecological systems. 
Consequently, the success of a marine reserve depends on managers‘ ability to alter 
human behavior in the direction and magnitude that supports reserve objectives. Further, 
a marine reserve is just one component in a larger coupled social-ecological system. The 
social, economic, political, and biological landscape all determine the social acceptability 
of a reserve, conflicts that arise, how the reserve interacts with existing fisheries 
management, accuracy of reserve monitoring, and whether the reserve is ultimately able 
to meet conservation and fishery enhancement goals. Just as the social-ecological 
landscape is critical at all stages for marine reserve, from initial establishment to 
maintenance, the reserve in turn interacts with biological and human use dynamics 
beyond its borders. Those interactions can lead to the failure of a reserve to meet 
management goals, or compromise management goals outside the reserve. I use a bio-
economic model of a fishery in a spatially patchy environment to demonstrate how the 
pre-reserve fisheries management strategy determines the pattern of fishing effort 
displacement once the reserve is established, and discuss the social, political, and 
biological consequences of different patterns for the reserve and the fishery. Using a 
stochastic bio-economic model, I demonstrate how biological and human use 
connectivity can confound the accurate detection of reserve effects by violating 
assumptions in the quasi-experimental framework. Finally, I examine data on recreational 
  ii 
fishing site selection to investigate changes in response to the announcement of 
enforcement of a marine reserve in the Gulf of California, Mexico. I generate a scale of 
fines that would fully or partially protect the reserve, providing a data-driven way for 
managers to balance biological and socio-economic goals.  I suggest that natural resource 
managers consider human use dynamics with the same frequency, rigor, and tools as they 
do biological stocks. 
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One, seven, three, five— 
The truth you search for cannot be grasped. 
As night approaches, a bright moon 
   illuminates the whole ocean; 
The dragon‘s jewels are found in every wave. 
Looking for the moon, it is here, 
   in this wave, in the next. 
 
 ~ Zen Master Hsueh-tou (980-1052)  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This work is focused on the application of quasi-experimental analysis in coupled 
human-ecological systems for natural resource management. For the purposes of 
illustration and intuition, I use theoretical examples and empirical data from a marine 
reserve system.  
Marine reserves are spatial tools for fisheries management and conservation that 
restrict extractive activities within designated areas.  This work deals with the class of 
marine reserves whose main feature is a no-take area, where all extractive activities are 
prohibited. Several highly influential articles in the marine reserve literature expound the 
rapid and strongly positive effect no-take areas have on protected stocks compared with 
control areas (Halpern 2003; Halpern & Warner 2002; Lester et al. 2009).  Consequently, 
marine reserves are widely used for sustainable fisheries management to enhance target 
species biomass and biodiversity beyond reserve borders through spillover (Roberts et al. 
2001; Guidetti 2007; McClanahan 2010).  Though marine reserves are not a panacea 
(Willis 2003; Wood et al. 2008), they remain a highly relevant management tool (Wells 
et al. 2008, Wood et al. 2008; McClanahan 2010, Pollnac et al. 2010). 
The importance of monitoring reserves to detect reserve effects (Russ and Alcala 
2003; Roberts et al. 2001) and to inform future management decisions (Fujitani et al. 
2012; Gerber et al 2005) is well-established.  Marine reserves are often designed with 
both biological conservation and human social welfare goals in mind (Pomeroy et al. 
2004; UNEP-WCMC 2008). Despite this, the evaluation of reserve effects has focused 
overwhelmingly on biological criteria (e.g. Halpern 2003; Halpern & Warner 2002; 
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UNEP-WCMC 2008; Lester et al. 2009). As with much of if not most conservation 
policy, marine reserves function by regulating (in this case limiting) human behavior.  
Reserves are areas where specific activities are restricted (Lynch 2006).  Therefore the 
success of such policies depends on the effectiveness of institutions at changing behavior 
in the requisite ways (Hilborn 2007). This dissertation focuses on the importance of 
human behavior to the implementation and persistence of marine reserves. 
For marine reserves to be established, they must exceed a threshold of social and 
cultural acceptability and political economy (Shindler et al. 1993; Smith et al. 2010). To 
be successfully implemented they must actually alter human behavior and reduce fishing 
pressure (Hilborn 2007; Fujitani et al. 2012). To persist they must maintain public 
acceptance, and as marine reserves are costly to operate (Carr 2000; Burke and Maidens 
2004), they must achieve biological and/or economic goals. In order to know whether 
biological goals are being met, as well as to inform future managerial decisions, reserves 
must be monitored (Russ and Alcala 2003; Gerber et al. 2005).  
Chapter One uses a bio-economic model of a fishery in a patchy environment to 
demonstrate how the fishery management strategy in place pre-reserve determines 
whether or not fishing effort that leaves a closed reserve area can be displaced outside the 
reserve. Whether or not there are available private net rents that allow fishers to re-
distribute effort outside a marine reserve has implications for the social acceptability and 
political economy of a marine reserve. Further, effort displacement outside of a marine 
reserve can render the area outside a reserve de-facto open access, with economic and 
biological consequences for the whole system. Chapter Two is concerned with biological 
reserve monitoring. I use a stochastic bio-economic model to demonstrate how human 
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use can confound the accurate detection of reserve effects by violating identifying 
assumptions in the quasi-experimental framework. If reserves are incorrectly analyzed to 
be achieving biological goals, political and financial capital are wasted. Further, we lose 
valuable information that could have been generated by proper quasi-experiments on 
reserve placement and coupled human-ecological system dynamics. Biological 
monitoring can be supplemented by human use monitoring, to provide indicators of 
potential biases towards the detection of reserve effects. In Chapter Three, I use data on 
recreational fishing site selection to investigate changes in response to the 2005 
announcement of enforcement in a marine reserve in the Gulf of California, Mexico, and 
use those data to generate a scale of fines that would fully or partially protect the reserve. 
A level of fine that is socially and politically acceptable is essential for the successful 
establishment and long-term persistence of a marine reserve, but a fine must also be 
effective in order for the reserve to have any effect on protected stocks. Information on 
how people respond to different penalties allows managers to balance biological and 
socio-economic goals. This dissertation covers a range of critical topics for marine 
reserves, and highlights the central importance of human behavior to natural resource 
management. 
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CHAPTER 2. MARINE RESERVE INTERACTIONS WITH EXISTING FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT: WHEN TWO RIGHTS MAKE A WRONG 
2.1 Introduction 
In marine resource management, multiple management tools are frequently 
employed simultaneously in a given geographical area (Crutchfield 1979; FAO 1997). In 
the U.S., for example, it is common for a size limit to govern take within a limited fishing 
season, layered over general gear restrictions, and operating within a patchwork of 
restricted use and no-take marine sanctuaries (e.g. USFW 2013). The term ‗layer cake‘ to 
refer to the practice of adding new regulations on top of old ones in attempt to improve 
overall management was coined by the French Fisheries committee president Alain 
Parres in 1999 (Lequesne 2004). As subsequent layers are added to the regulatory ―cake,‖ 
previously existing regulations are retained largely untouched due to their previous track 
record, familiarity, and as biological and political precautions (Lequense 2004; Hilborn 
2013). Belying the ―delicious‖ synergy invoked by the confectionery metaphor, layered 
management institutions are rarely strategically coordinated (Sanchirico et al.2010; Collie 
et al. 2013), and instead of building upon each other can interact in ways that lead to 
undesirable consequences for the fishery (Grafton et al. 2000; Abbott and Haynie 2012; 
Hilborn 2013).  
I focus on the consequences of regulatory interactions when marine reserves are 
layered atop existing fishery management. Marine reserves are a popular tool for 
conservation and fisheries management (Roberts et al. 2001; Halpern and Warner 2002; 
Guidetti et al. 2007; Lester et al. 2009). Reserves operate by restricting specific activities 
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within a designated space (Lynch 2006). In the case of no-take marine reserves 
(hereafter, ―marine reserves‖) all extractive activities are prohibited within the reserve 
boundary.
1
 Reserves are not created in a vacuum— some form of fisheries management 
is in place before, and often the preceding approach to management continues to operate 
in the regions outside the reserve site (note that the absence of active management is a 
form of management). Though fishing effort is eliminated within a reserve, the reserve 
may have little bearing on the total fishing effort in the system, and effort may be 
spatially displaced outside the closure if the biological and economic conditions allow 
(Sanchirico and Wilen 2002; Kellner et al. 2007). If the fisheries management structure 
outside the reserve is what I term ‗rigid‘, fishing effort displaced from a reserve also 
leaves the fishery. This occurs when private net revenues in areas outside a reserve are 
already dissipated, for example in the case of open access. When there are no private net 
revenues available outside a reserve, there is no ‗slack‘ for fishers displaced by an area 
closure. Excess fishing effort must leave the system, with the accompanying economic 
consequences. If the management outside a reserve is what I term ‗flexible,‘ fishers 
displaced by an area closure move their fishing effort into areas outside a marine reserve. 
For example, a limited access system can preserve positive private net revenues. These 
private net revenues can be captured by fishers displaced by a marine reserve, allowing 
them to shift their effort outside the marine reserve. Flexibility for fishers would seem to 
be a desirable characteristic for a management regime, but in this case flexibility can lead 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘marine reserve’ is widely used as a synonym for a no-take zone, but can 
also refer to a designated marine area with less comprehensive human use restrictions. 
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to undesirable effects on stock subjected to higher fishing pressure. Using a bio-economic 
model, I provide an overview of fishers‘ qualitative responses when a no-take marine 
reserve is layered atop a variety of management strategies that fall into this ‗rigid‘ or 
‗flexible‘ taxonomy, and discuss the implications of these responses for the biological, 
economic, and political success of a marine reserve.  
I contribute to the literature by modeling specifically defined examples of five 
management strategies (Table 1), and demonstrate how these representative examples 
interact with marine reserves. I find that management strategies that allow for flexibility 
also permit effort prohibited in a reserve to be displaced outside, with consequences for 
the system as a whole.  Two key insights emerge.  First, successful catch shares programs 
can be potentially undermined by laying on a reserve.  Second, the layering of a reserve 
creates hereto unanticipated differences among incentive based approaches to fishery 
management.  Taken together these realizations suggest that singularly positive 
regulatory changes could negatively impact the long run success of fishery management. 
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Table 2-1. Summary of management strategies covered 
Management 
Type 
Management 
Description 
Implementation in the Model 
Classified as 
Flexible or 
Rigid 
Pre-Reserve Post-Reserve 
Open Access No management 
Gordon-
Schaefer open 
access bionomic 
equilibrium 
No change 
 
Rigid 
Regulated 
Open Access 
Limits on the 
intensive margin 
(e.g. gear 
restrictions, size 
limits)  
Decrease 
catchability 
relative to open 
access 
No change: 
Regulation stays 
in place 
Rigid 
Landing Tax 
Tax on landed 
harvest 
Tax per unit 
harvest 
No change: 
Tax remains the 
same 
Rigid 
Limited 
Access 
Limits on the 
extensive margin  
Limit effort, 
positive net 
revenues 
possible 
System-wide 
effort remains the 
same 
Flexible 
Individual 
Transferrable 
Quota (ITQ) 
Quota limiting 
harvest; individual 
catch share – 
tradable between 
fishers 
Quota market 
clearing price 
corresponds to  
landing tax 
Quota price is 
lowered to keep 
system-wide 
harvest amount 
(quota) the same 
Flexible 
 
 
  8 
 
2.2 Fisheries Management Strategies 
The status quo that relies on multiple fisheries management strategies will persist 
into the future because there is no single panacea for marine management, and 
combinations of controls are necessary (Waters et al. 1991; Holling and Meffe 1996; 
Hilborn et al. 2004; Ostrom et al. 2007). For example, marine reserves alone are not 
sufficiently flexible or comprehensive to achieve the broad spectrum of fishery 
management and conservation goals (Allison 1998; Sanchirico et al. 2010). The strengths 
of reserves as tools for biodiversity and habitat conservation (Halpern and Warner 2002; 
Lester et al. 2009), and as a hedge against ecosystem and management uncertainty 
(Allison et al. 1998; Gell and Roberts 2003) could ideally supplement or complement 
other management strategies that each have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
However, regulatory tapestries seldom emerge through thoughtful arrangement of 
management combinations, but instead arise through path-dependence and myopic 
decision-making (Wilen 1988; Sanchirico et al.2010; Hilborn 2013; Collie et al. 2013). I 
model the interactions between marine reserves and five management strategies 
summarized in Table 1, and describe them below.  
The management strategies are ordered from least to most structure and 
institutional strength, and classified as ‗rigid‘ or ‗flexible,‘ that is whether or not the bio-
economic landscape allows fishers displaced from a marine reserve to fish in areas 
outside the reserve. There is a general trend for more structured management systems to 
also build in more ‗flexibility‘, a characteristic viewed as favorable on its own.  Indeed, 
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preserving flexibility for fishers helps them lower costs while achieving biological 
objectives.  It is this flexibility however that creates scope for negative system-wide 
consequences when interacting with a marine reserve. 
The majority of fisheries worldwide use a combination of reserves, pure, and 
regulated open access (Worm et al. 2009). Pure open access is the classic example of a 
common pool resource (Gordon 1954; Clark 1973; Ostrom 1999). Assuming multiple 
independent fishers, no individual has an incentive to consider how their actions 
influence the collective good.  An individual will ramp up their fishing or additional 
fishers will enter the fishery until the stock is depleted and the marginal cost of fishing 
(including opportunity costs) equals marginal revenue, and net revenue is at zero (Gordon 
1954). Thus, open access fisheries theoretically result in both a poor economic outcome 
and a biologically over-exploited stock as the race to fish leads to stock and inter-
temporal externalities (where harvest becomes more costly as the size of the fished 
population decreases, and where a density-dependent intrinsic stock growth rate would 
make it socially desirable to leave a larger unfished population; Scott 1955; Hardin 1968; 
Smith 1969). The open access levels of stock and effort are the baseline unfavorable 
scenarios that regulation seeks to improve upon. In an open access case where all private 
net revenues are dissipated (at zero) in the system, effort displaced due to the creation of 
a marine reserve would find no private net rents to capture in the fishery; the amount of 
effort displaced by the marine reserve would also leave the fishery. The open access case 
with net revenue dissipation falls into the ‗rigid‘ category.  
Regulated open access introduces some limitations imposed by external fisheries 
management by restricting along the intensive margin (the amount extracted per unit of 
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the extensive margin, e.g. a single fishing vessel), often by increasing the variable cost of 
fishing (Waters 1991). A few examples of such regulations are gear restrictions, vessel 
size restrictions, limits on fishing time (open seasons), and size limits (on how large or 
small a fish must be to be kept). With regulated open access, managers attempt to control 
fishing mortality through the intensive margin, for example by making fishing less 
efficient and more costly (Waters 1991; FAO 1998). Regulated open access control of a 
fishery is often viewed as inefficient and problematic, as regulations slow fishing through 
costly frictions that are lost to society (Crutchfield 1979; Waters 1991; FAO 1998), and 
can result in greater economic inefficiency than even open access (Homans and Wilen 
1997). Further, though regulatory limits are placed on the intensive margin in regulated 
open access, unless fishers are somehow limited in their other intensive inputs and along 
the extensive margin the economic aspects of open access (net revenues driven to zero) 
may occur (Homans and Wilen 1997; Deacon et al. 2011).  Controlling these various 
inputs along both margins is difficult, and when managers fail to keep private net rents 
from being dissipated, regulated open access falls into the ‗rigid‘ category of 
management strategies for the same reason as open access. Despite economic 
inefficiencies, if the frictions successfully slow fishing biological targets may be met. In 
developing nations, regulated open access and reserves are often utilized in part due to 
political and logistical convenience or necessity as they are perceived to require less 
institutional structure than other management strategies (Agardy 1997; Wilen 2006). 
However, institutional strength and capacity are still required as weak institutions can 
lead to de-facto open access. This is illustrated by the outcomes of reserves employed in 
tandem with regulated open access regimes that are strongly protected (e.g. Russ et al. 
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2004) versus those existing only on paper (e.g. Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009; Fujitani et al. 
2012).  
Limited access is another common management strategy that co-exists with 
marine reserves (e.g. Guidetti et al. 2008). Limited access attempts to constrain fishing 
along the extensive margin, e.g., by limiting the number of boats that are allowed to fish 
in a given area. However, even if the extensive margin (entry) is successfully limited, 
fishers may expand on the intensive margin, for example by increasing time spent 
fishing, the number of per vessel, or the size and speed of a boat (Clark 1980; Waters 
1991). Such adaptations are common, as can be seen from reviews of limited entry 
programs (Wilen 1988; Townsend 1990).  When the number of vessels, amount of total 
catch, and fishing time are limited, fishers can still engage in ‗capital stuffing‘ (Copes 
and Cook, 1981; Rettig 1984; Stollery 1986), for example changing fishing gear and 
increasing vessel tonnage and length. The limited entry fishery is a classic example of 
reactive regulatory layering to improve overall fishery outcomes given human behavioral 
adaptation; this can be seen in the British Colombian salmon fleet as managers first 
limited the number of vessels but subsequently expanded limits to cover vessel tonnage, 
then length, then gear  (Wilen 1988). Elaborate combinations of regulations are required 
to restrict the intensive margin while license-limiting the extensive margin (Clark 1990; 
unless fishers cannot easily substitute inputs; Deacon et al. 2011). If successful, private 
net revenues can be preserved in a limited access fishery that can be seen, for example, as 
the market price of a freely tradable license (Waters 1991). Successful limited access 
schemes (i.e. where private net revenues are preserved) are ‗flexible‘ management, 
because unlike in the previous two cases, if an area is closed to fishing, the positive 
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private net revenues in other areas provide ‗slack‘ that displaced fishers can move into 
and capture.  
Property rights regimes such as individual tradable quotas (ITQs) give fishers 
ownership over a portion of the fish stock, and are a popular management tool 
increasingly advocated (Waters 1991; Berkes et al. 2006) and implemented worldwide 
(Chu 2009; Tveteras et al. 2011), especially in light of the shortcomings of previously 
discussed management strategies (Wilen et al. 2006; Arnason 2012). With an ITQ, a 
fisher is granted exclusive rights to catch their quota, which is usually an annual 
allocation of a total allowable catch (TAC) for a particular fish stock over a given region 
(Christy 1973). The quota is ‗tradable‘ because quota owners can sell their share of the 
allowable catch to other interested parties. Property rights such as ITQs can lead to 
increased efficiency and profitability in the fishery (Arnason 2012) while allowing fishers 
flexibility when, where, and to some degree how to fish (Waters 1991; Wilen 2006). In 
theory property rights and other public-private partnerships can increase stewardship of 
resources by strengthening the connection between economic resource utilization 
decisions and their ecological consequences (FAO 1998; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2013), 
particularly with long-term rights (Scott 1955; Costello and Kaffine 2007). However, 
unless property rights are secured over the entire ecosystem, property rights strategies do 
not necessarily circumvent resource degradation and capital overinvestment (Larson and 
Bromley 1990; Clark 1973) or align incentives to support conservation goals (Copes 
1986; Ostrom et al. 1999; Essington et al. 2012). To meet mixed economic and 
conservation goals, rights-based management strategies and reserves are often employed 
together (e.g. Paddack and Estes 2000; Taylor and Buckenham 2003; Abbott and Haynie 
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2013). ITQs are ‗flexible‘ management strategies, because fishers can respond the closure 
of one area to fishing by shifting to another area. Fishers can shift because successful ITQ 
management constrains harvest in a system, creating biological and economic ‗slack‘ 
(e.g. positive private net revenue), and fishers can displace into this ‗slack‘ in the system.  
In theory a landing tax is provides identical marginal incentives as an ITQ 
(Bhagwati 1965; Clark 1980). In practice, however, they are different, as quota directly 
while taxes indirectly limit the amount caught. With ITQs, positive net revenues accrue 
to quota owners, while taxes go to the regulatory body. Landing taxes are not frequently 
utilized as management strategies due to the political unpopularity of taxes in general 
(FAO 1998). Taxes can directly be perceived as a reducing the wealth of fishers though 
in theory a tax could be transferred back to fishers in a way that does not influence 
behavior (Bhagwati and Ramaswami 1963). An appropriately set landing tax can restrict 
effort to obtain the maximum biological yield given the least amount of effort for a 
fishery (Clark 1980), though in practice the level of tax would be difficult to set and 
would require spatially and temporally heterogeneous taxes (Clark 1980; Weitzman 
2002). However, compared to a static level of quota in an ITQ as described above, a 
static tax level would fall into the ‗rigid‘ category of management because fishers 
respond to private net revenues. With a landing tax, the net revenues in the system are 
siphoned off into the tax, and there is no ‗slack‘ for fishers to displace into as are found in 
the ITQ case. 
Regulatory layer cakes are ubiquitous; indeed, they are built out of necessity 
given the limitations of each individual ‗layer.‘ However, fishers and the managed 
ecosystem must consume the whole ‗cake‘, and respond to its combined characteristics. 
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Similarly, instead of thinking about management in a piecemeal way it is critical for 
managers to understand the managed system holistically including how the pieces 
interact. Management layering reserves with other fishery management institutions is 
common, and this condition can be expected to persist. 
2.3 Methods 
I build on Gordon-Smith style bio-economic models utilized by Sanchirico and 
Wilen (1999; 2001; 2005) to simulate fish stocks and their harvest.  Discrete spatial 
patches of a representative fish stock are modeled, first in isolated patches with no 
migration, and then with the ability to migrate among patches according to stock 
densities. Stock are subject to Gordon-Schaefer harvest by fishers who choose patches (or 
whether or not) to fish in order to maximize net private revenues given costs. A reserve is 
created in one patch in this system, in order to observe shifts in stock and effort in 
response to the marine reserve under flexible and rigid fishery management regimes. 
Model parameters used are listed in Appendix 1. 
2.3.1 Biological Model 
I model discrete stock (X) growth of the fish stock in each patch with the Ricker 
function (Ricker 1954).  
 (  )      
     
Where the Ricker parameters can be given interpretations mapping to the logistic growth 
model     and   
 
 
, so that          
 (  (
  
 
))
, in which case   is the intrinsic 
growth rate and the biological carrying capacity, K, can be viewed as a proxy for 
environmental productivity . 
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The single patch model is expanded to a meta-population model with connectivity 
and harvest for each patch i as: 
         (         ∑        
 
   
   
), for all         
where d describes migration between patches.     is the proportion of stock in patch i 
staying in patch i, while      is the portion moving into patch i from patch j. Between 
adjacent patches, the rate of migration is density dependent: the between-patch 
differentials in the ratio of stock level in a patch and that patch‘s carrying capacity as 
compared to a neighboring patch, shown here between patches 1 and 2:  
             (
  
  
  
  
  
) 
             (
  
  
  
  
  
)  
  
If stock in patch 1 is closer to its carrying capacity than stock in patch 2, the ratio of stock 
to carrying capacity in patch 1 will be higher, and thus stock will flow out of patch 1 and 
into patch 2, all else equal. The parameter b is the maximum rate at which stock 
movement can occur. This rate parameter can be varied to account for life history 
attributes of the representative fish species (sedentary versus highly migratory) and 
environmental characteristics in the simulated system (current speed, distance between 
habitable patches).  
I model three discrete spatial patches, with a variety of fish connectivity 
configurations, with density-dependent flow between connected patches. The 
configurations used are: isolated patches with no connectivity (Figure 1; A), fully 
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integrated connectivity (Figure 1; B), and a linear cascade (Figure 1; C), where only 
patches designated as adjacent mix. A linear cascade of patches can occur due to 
geographic (e.g. along a coastline) or oceanographic features (e.g. strong currents, 
upwelling areas). Linear cascade can also occur if the patches are nested spatially, for 
example with patch 1 as a reserve, patch 2 would be a spatially equivalent buffer zone 
around the reserve. 
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Figure 2-1. Three-patch connectivity configurations explored; patch 1 is designated as a 
reserve.  
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2.3.2 Economic Model 
Schaefer harvest,          , is a function of the catchability coefficient, q, and 
the stock size and effort E. In discrete time the three-patch Schaefer harvest model is 
(Conrad 1999): 
      (         )      (   
(      )),         
and is coupled to biological stock growth and migration:  
         (         ∑        
 
   
   
)      , for all         
I utilize the classical single-input model.  In this model the only dimension fishers 
choose is effort (E) and each individual fisher acts to maximize his private net revenue.  
Individuals enter the fishery if there are private net revenues to capture, and each fisher 
intensifies fishing to equalize private marginal revenue with private marginal cost.  Net 
revenues from fishing in a patch depend on catch, price per unit of catch,  , and the cost 
associated with fishing.  
  (         )   (        )  (    )    ,         
   is the baseline variable cost to fish in a particular patch, which depends on site 
characteristics such as the distance of the patch from port and operating costs specific to a 
particular patch.   is the per unit effort opportunity cost of fishing rather than pursuing 
employment elsewhere. Only variable costs (per unit effort) are represented in the 
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model.
2
 Given revenues available after costs (net revenues), the homogenous pool of 
fishers allocate their fishing effort according to 
           (         )  ∑    [  (         )    (         )]
 
   
   
,         
where fishers move to patches that yielded greater private net revenues in the previous 
time step, or leave the fishery if no private net revenues are available anywhere in the 
system. Just as the Gordon-Smith fisheries model echoes predator-prey interactions with 
fishers as predators and fish as prey, fishers allocate in space in way similar to the ‗ideal 
free distribution‘ of foraging animals dispersing spatially onto available patches of 
limited resources. Instead of forage, fishers select patches in pursuit of private net 
revenues. The model puts a limitation on how quickly a fisher can switch patches or enter 
or leave the fishery to take into account time necessary to ‗learn‘ that fishing is better 
somewhere else (Smith 1968), as well as fixed costs, uncertainty, and other realities that 
make instantaneous entry and exit from the fishery profession impossible.     is the rate at 
which fishers can enter and leave the fishery, and     is the rate at which fishers can 
reallocate effort between patches (Smith 1969; Sanchirico and Wilen 1999).  
2.3.3 Modeling Fishery Management  
Fisheries management operates by adjusting incentives, for example by command 
and control regulations that increase the cost of fishing, or by extending fishers property 
rights to the resource (Waters 1991). The modeling framework for each fishery 
management option is summarized in Table 1. In practice, management strategies are 
                                                 
2
 Fixed costs (modeled as an additional constant) do not affect qualitative fishing 
behavior.   
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implemented in a variety of different ways, and the structure of implementation as well as 
the strength of enforcement affects how fishers respond. Reserves are a clear example of 
how implementation and enforcement matters, and may vary in their regulations, level of 
enforcement, and efficacy (Mora et al. 2006; Lester & Halpern 2008). Further, the many 
ways people can respond to regulations unexpectedly has been extensively documented 
(e.g. Wilen et al. 2002; Hilborn 2007). Each of the five fishery management strategies are 
modeled to deterministically respond to management (Table 1). The system dynamics, 
governed by each management regime, are simulated until the system reaches 
equilibrium stock and effort levels.  Then a reserve is created in patch 1.  I simulate 
reserve creation by raising the cost to fish until effort within the reserve falls to zero.  
This mirrors how reserves work though adjusting incentives and reducing fishing visits 
through the enforcement of rules and fines (see Chapter 3).  
The private net revenue-maximizing model without regulation is the baseline 
open access case. Regulated open access operates by directly increasing the cost per unit 
catch of fishing and reducing technical efficiency, for example by reducing catchability 
(also called gear efficiency; Hilborn and Walters 1992). When catchability is decreased, 
harvesting costs increase as catch per unit effort declines, while cost per unit effort 
remains the same (Godo 1990). Therefore, I model regulated open access is modeled by 
reducing catchability, q, in the harvest function:         . Decreases in catchability act 
like friction and are completely losses to the fishery and society. Net revenues in each 
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patch are driven to zero under regulated open access in this model, so while biological 
targets may be met there is no economic difference from the open access scenario.
3
  
 A landing tax is a tax per unit harvest, which in a three-patch model is:  
  (         )   (        )   (        )           (    )    ,         
In principle, a land tax can be returned in a behaviorally neutral way, perhaps through a 
subsidy (Bhagwati and Ramaswami 1963).  Therefore, the landing tax is not a complete 
loss to society, like the friction of regulated open access. Nevertheless, regulated open 
access and a landing tax have a common feature.  They are both ‗rigid‘ management 
strategies, because individual fishers take into account their additional private marginal 
costs and choose how much to fish to equalize these costs with private marginal revenue. 
Thus, even though net revenue to society may be non-zero, individuals will enter the 
fishery / effort will expand until there are no more available private net revenues. As long 
as the regulated open access regulations and landing tax do not change concurrent with 
the reserve and alter the private net revenues, ‗rigidity‘ will persist post-reserve.  
 The complex regulatory bundles required for limited access regimes to provide 
for positive net revenues (Clark 1990) are beyond the scope of this paper.  In practice 
these bundles do exist.  For example, Fenichel and Abbott (2014) show the patchwork or 
regulation in the Gulf of Mexico reef complex that persisted in the early 2000s preserved 
some net revenues. I model a representative case where limited access restricts the effort 
in fishery such that non-zero net revenues are available. I model limited access by placing 
                                                 
3
 Different outcomes could be found with a multiple input model (e.g. Deacon et al. 
2011), though a single-input model is sufficient for the intuition of my main findings. 
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an upper limit on the amount of effort allowed in the system, but otherwise allowing the 
effort to freely allocate according to the model. Effort is truly limited in this single-input 
model as it is the only input fishers have; there are no other margins to expand upon.  
A tradable quota system sets a total allowable catch (TAC) that limits the amount 
that can be harvested in an area.  I assume the TAC encompasses all patches in the 
model.  Indeed, in practice TACs are often set with respect to a stock, and marine 
reserves only cover a portion of the range of a stock (e.g. Starr et al. 2004).  I am unaware 
of a case where the establishment or existence of a marine reserve has been factored into 
a TAC.   
I simulate a quota over two steps, the first of which involves the landing tax. If 
rights to harvest quota from a set TAC are freely tradable (individual tradable quota, or 
ITQ), then an equilibrium market clearing price for quota emerges in the market. That 
market clearing quota price provides identical incentives to an equal amount of tax on 
harvest that would constrain harvest to the level of TAC (Bhagwati 1965; Clark 1980). 
For a given level of landing tax, there exists an implicit quota. To simulate a quota, I use 
a landing tax in the model, but replace the land tax with the market clearing quota price. 
When I simulate the creation of a marine reserve, effort goes to zero in the reserve 
(Figure 2; Patch 1). Since the quota is on overall harvest, there is quota available that can 
be filled (Figure 2A). Thus, effort can expand in patch 2 (Figure 2B; Patch 2) as long as 
quota exists, and it is biologically and economically feasible to harvest (e.g. private net 
revenues are available).  In order to allow this effort to expand (to simulate the harvest 
quota), the market clearing quota price is reduced until post-reserve harvest equals the 
pre-reserve equilibrium level (Figure 2B; Total Harvest). There may be occasions where 
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the quota is non-binding, that is, it is not economically feasible to fill the available quota. 
This occurs in the model when the market clearing quota price is reduced to zero, 
following the simulated creation of the reserve, but the post-reserve harvest remains 
lower than pre-reserve levels.  If the market clearing quota price reaches zero, then this 
implies no fishing within the reserve but open access outside of the reserve. 
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Figure 2-2. Qualitative effort and harvest response in two patches (B) before and (A) 
after patch 1 becomes a marine reserve with I) a static quota price (or landing tax) for the 
system versus II) a quota (or landing tax) that is reduced post-reserve to preserve the 
quota (keep harvest constant) 
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2.4 Results  
 First, consider systems with biological patches isolated to stock immigration or 
emigration. When a biologically isolated patch is closed to fishing, stock in that patch 
grows and approaches carrying capacity as fishing effort falls to zero (Figure 3; ‗stock in 
reserve‘). Under ‗rigid‘ management private net revenues in all patches were already 
dissipated before the reserve was established (e.g. in the open access case; Gordon 1954). 
Though effort is pushed out of the reserve, effort cannot displace onto fishing grounds 
outside the reserve (Figure 3A; ‗effort outside‘) because there are no private net revenues 
available to fishers. Effort must leave the system. The lack of long-term fishing 
displacement occurs in all rigid management styles. From society‘s perspective a landing 
tax is not a ‗cost‘ that is lost to society; it is rather a transfer (Clark 1980).  But, from the 
fishers‘ perspectives the tax is a private cost that enters their fishing decision process, and 
upon accounting for the private tax costs fishers do not find private net revenue available 
anywhere in the fishery. 
 When reserves are located in regions managed with ‗flexible‘ strategies, fishers 
can relocate effort from the marine reserve area to areas outside the reserve.  There is 
―room‖ to expand effort in patches outside the reserve (Figure 3B; ‗effort displacement‘), 
but this will decrease stock biomass outside the reserve (Figure 3B; ‗stock outside‘). 
When limited access preserves private net revenues outside the reserve, effort can 
displace outside the reserve as in Figure 3B.  
 An ITQ can also lead to long-term effort displacement into other patches if the 
TAC is not adjusted to remove biomass protected within the reserve. Moreover, it is 
uncommon to adjust TACs for marine reserves, and ITQs most commonly sum to the 
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total allowable catch (TAC) designated for a broad region (Buck 1995; Sanchirico et al. 
2006).  The flexibility of the ITQ system allows fishers to fill their quota anywhere in the 
system that it is economically feasible (positive private net revenues available). In the no 
migration case stock in the reserve increases to carrying capacity, but depending on the 
size of the TAC, allocated by ITQ, stocks outside the reserve decline, possibly to the 
open access level.  Indeed, the areas outside the reserve may function as open access if 
the ITQ price is driven to zero, which will happen if the reserve is large enough and fleet 
cannot fill the TAC without encroaching on the reserve.  
Sanchirico and Wilen (2002) demonstrated that stock and harvest gains from a 
reserve are greater the closer the initial system is to open access, and the higher the level 
of stock migration is from the reserve to fished patches. Open access levels of effort 
result in the lowest equilibrium stock levels for a given parameterization.  Under any 
form of management other than open access, stocks have a greater pre-reserve 
equilibrium stock biomass, and thus there less biological net gain from establishing a 
reserve. As regulations become stricter (e.g. a higher landing tax), the net effect of the 
reserve declines.  
Now, consider the possibility of fish movement among patches.  Stock dispersal 
out of a reserve, termed ‗spillover‘, is frequently cited as the way reserves enhance catch 
for adjacent fisheries (Guidetti 2002; Roberts et al. 2001). Spillover allows for increased 
effort and catch outside of reserves. Spillover is essential for displaced by the reserve to 
have viable fishing opportunities outside of the reserve under ‗rigid‘ management 
regimes. For a reserve to enable an aggregate increase in harvest and effort under ‗rigid‘ 
regime, prior to the reserve there must be low levels of regulation, depressed stocks, and 
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a high migration rate (Figure 4B1). The pre-reserve status of stocks affects the post-
reserve gradients for stock diffusion between patches. In Figure 4, (A1) and (B1) have 
identical migration rate parameters yet post-reserve stocks are greater in (A1) than (B1).  
However, total harvest and effort decline in the high landing tax scenario (A1), but 
increase in the low tax scenario, if the migration rate is great enough (B1).  This suggests 
that the extent to which a reserve can be used to reach broader regional fishery 
management goals depends on the intensity of management regime, in addition to the 
flexibility afforded to fishers.  Furthermore, even with a rigid management approach 
there may be tradeoffs between stock conservation and fishery yield, resulting in conflict 
with the protective mechanism as well as conservation objectives of the reserve (Hastings 
and Botsford 2003).  
 With ‗flexible‘ management, post-reserve fishers can displace effort to patches 
outside the reserve. Stock spillover from migration increases the amount of effort the 
patches outside the reserve can support (Figure 5). However, despite or due to the 
increase in effort, total harvest may decline post-reserve (Figure 5; A2, B1, B2). In some 
cases increased productivity in the reserve patch alone is insufficient to make up for 
harvest displaced from the reserve patch, and the outside patches subsequently become 
de-facto open access (Copes 1986) with excess effort and lower system productivity 
overall (Figure 5). With low migration rates and lighter restrictions (e.g. limited access 
that permits a large amount of effort or a large quota), as stock and effort outside the 
reserve approach open access conditions, both total effort and harvest decline post-
reserve (Figure 6).  
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 Finally, consider a linear cascade configuration (Figure 1C), with density 
dependent migration between neighboring patches, i.e., between 1 and 2, and 2 and 3, as 
opposed to full connectivity among all patches. The ‗rigid‘ management and reserve 
scenarios are all qualitatively the same as before, except spillover from the reserve patch 
1 to the adjacent patch 2 is harvested there before any stock can disperse to patch 3. With 
flexible management, the post-reserve outcome will only match the pre-reserve level of 
total harvest in the cascade configuration under high levels of migration (Figure 7). Post-
reserve stock levels are slightly higher in patch 3 than patch 2, and more effort is drawn 
into the more productive patch 2, which is the recipient of immigrating stock from both 
patches 1 and 3 (Figure 7).  
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Figure 2-3. Qualitative responses of effort and stock for two biologically isolated patches 
before and after one of the patches becomes a marine reserve, given ‗rigid‘ and ‗flexible‘ 
management existing outside the reserve site. 
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Figure 2-4. Representative examples of stock and effort responses to ‗rigid‘ management. 
Stock (X) and effort (E) levels in patches 1 through 3 are shown before (grey) and after 
(black) the creation of a reserve in patch 1. Stock are allowed free migration between 
patches along the diffusion gradient of their relative stock proportions of carrying 
capacity. (A) are systems with severe regulation, for example a high static landing tax, 
while (B) have lighter regulations, for example a low landing tax. (A1) and (B1) have a 
high stock migration rate (b = 0.9) while (A2) and (B2) have a low stock migration rate 
(b = 0.05). 
S
to
c
k
 a
n
d
 e
ff
o
rt
 l
e
v
e
ls
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 S
to
c
k
 a
n
d
 e
ff
o
rt
 l
e
v
e
ls
 
  31 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Representative examples of stock and effort responses to ‗flexible‘ 
management (e.g. ITQ, limited access). Stock (X) and effort (E) levels in patches 1 
through 3 are shown before (grey) and after (black) the creation of a reserve in patch 1. 
Stock are allowed free migration between patches along the diffusion gradient of their 
relative stock proportions of carrying capacity. (A) are systems with a high quota market 
clearing price, and (B) a lower quota market clearing price. (A1) and (B1) have a high 
stock migration rate (b = 0.9) while (A2) and (B2) have an intermediate stock migration 
rate (b = 0.3). 
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Figure 2-6. Stock, effort, and harvest responses to ‗flexible‘ management with light 
restrictions (e.g. limited access permitting a large amount of effort) and low migration 
rates. Stock (X) and effort (E) levels in patches 1 through 3 are shown before (grey) and 
after (black) the creation of a reserve in patch 1. Stock are allowed free migration 
between patches along the diffusion gradient of their relative stock proportions of 
carrying capacity. 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
S
to
c
k
 a
n
d
 e
ff
o
rt
 l
e
v
e
ls
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7. Stock, effort, and harvest responses to ‗flexible‘ management with severe 
restrictions (e.g. limited access permitting a small amount of effort or a small ITQ quota). 
Stock (X) and effort (E) levels in patches 1 through 3 are shown before (grey) and after 
(black) the creation of a reserve in patch 1. Stock migrate between patches along the 
diffusion gradient in a linear cascade from patch 1 to patch 3. (A)  has a high stock 
migration rate (b = 0.9) while (B) has an intermediate stock migration rate (b = 0.3). 
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2.5 Discussion 
The management of social-ecological systems is complicated by the dynamic 
interactions between ecosystems and human use. These complexities are magnified as 
different management layers interact, and the system responds to the regulatory gestalt: 
the whole beyond the sum of its parts.  Previous work on management strategy 
interactions is sparse, but has shown that there can be complementarity or conflict 
between different management layers under different circumstances, with accompanying 
biological and economic gains or losses (Sanchirico and Wilen 2002; Costello and 
Kaffine 2010; Abbott and Haynie 2013). I contribute to this literature by analyzing the 
management interactions between a marine reserve and five other management strategies.  
Contrary to general assumptions about marine reserves (Halpern et al. 2004; 
Hilborn et al. 2004), in a number of scenarios there is no equilibrium effort displacement 
from the reserve patch to patches that are open to fishing (Figure 3).  Under ‗rigid‘ 
management, no effort from the reserve when it is closed to fishing can displace into 
patches outside the reserve unless there is stock migration out of the reserve, and stock 
spillover generally requires a lag. Marine reserves are advocated and used as 
management tools for areas lacking strong institutional control of fisheries (i.e. open 
access and weak regulated open access regimes; Agardy 1997; National Research 
Council 2001), such as in developing economies.  However, the fact that there is nowhere 
for fishing effort to displace to (in the short term, and in the long term if stock spillover 
never occurs) has important implications for social justice and compliance with reserve 
rules in subsistence fisheries (Hughes et al. 2011).  Even if the opportunity cost is zero 
and there is no employment available outside the fishery, fishers may be forced out as the 
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costs of fishing (fuel, boat maintenance) cannot be met because there are no private net 
revenues available to support them in the fishery. In cases without reserve spillover and 
in the absence of fines and stringent enforcement to offset the potential gains of illegal 
fishing in the reserve, poaching is inevitable (Guidetti et al. 2008; Bruner et al. 2001).  
But, if there is likely to be poaching, then strong enforcement institutions are needed for 
the reserve to exist on more than just paper, thereby undermining one of the chief 
arguments in favor of marine reserves in locations with weak institutions.  Furthermore, 
where there are employment opportunities available outside the fishery (e.g. ecotourism) 
a social justice issue persists when people are pushed out of a hereditary and cultural 
industry such as fishing (Pollnac and Poggie 2008; Broad and Sanchirico 2010; Hughes 
2011; Smith 2013).  
With ‗rigid‘ institutions, stock spillover is the only mechanism by which fishing 
effort can be displaced outside a reserve. When stock spillover does occur, spillover 
magnitude and the configuration of biological connectivity between the reserve and 
fished patches determine fishing opportunities. Gradients of fishing opportunities inside 
versus outside reserves affect incentives for poaching. Migration and regulation also 
interact: with stricter regulations, the stock in all patches is maintained at a high level 
(e.g. Figure 4A1), but because of the lower gradient between the reserve and outside 
patches there may be little spillover. With looser regulations stock in all patches are more 
deteriorated, and poachers may be tempted by the higher catch per unit effort available in 
the reserve compared to outside, when the spillover rate is not high enough to 
compensate lost harvest. Thus poaching could be expected in the lag during stock 
rebuilding before spillover occurs. However, once stocks are rebuilt, fishers can expect 
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the largest amount of spillover and increased harvest with less severe management 
outside the reserve (Figure 4B1) due to the gradient between stock in the reserve and 
stock outside. In summary, poaching may be expected less with stricter regulations (e.g. 
Figure 4A1), especially if effective stricter regulations are correlated with increased 
enforcement for poaching. With laxer regulations and stock that is initially depleted, 
poaching can be expected in the short term with both high and low rates of migration, and 
in the long term with low rates of migration. Lax regulations and low rates of poaching 
enforcement may be correlated, especially if the lax regulations and deteriorated stock 
come about from low regulatory enforcement of strict rules. Finally, a cascade 
configuration of biological connectivity can create a bottleneck if economic conditions 
lead to harvest of all reserve spillover in patch 2 before it can reach patch 3. Under the 
same dispersal rate, fully mixed connectivity supports more effort and harvest than a 
cascade configuration.  
 Even in the absence of spillover, fishers displaced when a reserve is closed to 
fishing move outside the reserve into ‗slack‘ afforded by a ‗flexible‘ management system. 
Flexibility for fishers is overwhelmingly seen as a good thing, and is one of the selling 
points of ITQs (Waters 1991; Wilen 2006). The ability for fishers to displace to new 
fishing grounds when expelled from marine reserves may seem favorable from an 
economic or social perspective, especially with limited spillover from the reserve in the 
short or long term. However, for overall biological and fishery management goals 
displacement can be problematic, resulting in open patches being fished down to the 
biologically low open access levels, losing the enhanced productivity of a greater 
equilibrium stock. Interviews with New England fishermen found they did not support 
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new reserves layered on existing management as they stated existing regulation 
adequately achieved fishing mortality reduction (Smith 2013). The fishers reported that 
reserves condensed effort. However, we have shown that this is only the case with 
‗flexible‘ management, as likely exists highly managed New England fishery. Indeed, 
circumstances where the economic loss of harvest due to reserves can be ‗cushioned‘ 
through human movement are likely places where management is relatively effective at 
reducing catch and effort levels to sustainable levels, as successful implementation of 
limited access and ITQs require strong oversight from functioning institutions (Wilen 
1988; Chu 2009). However, this ‗cushion‘ comes with a cost: without adequate stock 
spillover, there are lowered economic benefits to all, including those not displaced by the 
reserve. Yet, the rationale for a reserve may extend beyond reducing catch and effort 
levels to protecting habitat.  Furthermore, license limitation and ITQs, though they may 
alleviate open access stock externalities, they may not prevent congestion externalities 
and under some conditions derby fisheries (Waters 1991; Boyce 1992; Copes 1986; 
Costello and Deacon 2007). Interactions with marine reserves exacerbate the weaknesses 
of these ‗flexible‘ management strategies, creating an even more complex set of tradeoffs 
to consider prior to establishing a marine reserve. 
Movement into an open area, as seen in the ITQ and limited access scenario, can 
result in de facto open access outside of the reserve. This can be avoided by reducing 
quota to align with stock protected due to reserve implementation, but that would likely 
make reserves even more unpopular.  Furthermore, this may spatially explicit stock 
assessment models on which to base TACs and ITQ allocations, which could make trades 
more complex and reduce the effectiveness of ITQs. The model demonstrates that in the 
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absence of spillover, market price for quota should fall post-reserve.  A priori knowledge 
of this would also make reserves unpopular for quota holders, because it would make 
painfully clear that marine reserves reduce the capital assets of fishers.  Indeed marine 
reserve could undermine the ITQ incentives for foresighted management.  I could not 
find an instance in the literature where a quota was changed due to a marine reserve, 
though there are many examples of marine reserves in areas employing ITQs and limited 
access in Europe, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia (Babcock et al. 1999; 
Edgar and Barrett 1999; Paddack and Estes 2000; Guidetti et al. 2008). It may be useful 
to consider buying back (or leasing) quota in conjunction with closing an area under ITQ 
management to fishing, or further reducing effort in the limited access case in the interest 
of biological goals. This would be equivalent to a constant landing tax, and could be 
employed if managers wish to control the amount of effort that is displaced from the 
reserve, to prevent the region outside the reserve from becoming de-facto open access.  
In cases where fisheries are managed ‗rigidly‘ through regulated open access or a 
landing tax, effort moved out of the closed site is also moved out of the fishery due to 
dissipation of private net revenues. Aside from the social justice implications, these 
findings have ramifications for the political economy of reserves, as reserves are likely to 
be more acceptable among fishers if they assume they can move to an open area; if 
spillover or other benefits do not materialize, opposition to the reserve can grow over 
time (Smith et al. 2010). Opposition to reserves could be mitigated with diversified 
business opportunities and recognition of the value of reserves beyond fisheries 
enhancement; unlike the other fisheries management strategies discussed here, reserves 
can have the direct side effect of enhancing tourism (Sala et al. 2013). In the short and 
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long run, increased ecotourism opportunities can arise from a new marine reserve even in 
the absence of stock spillover (i.e. tourism to see large and abundant fish within a marine 
reserve), and the economic value of ecotourism  can exceed the value of local fisheries to 
the region (Badalamenti et al. 2000; Sala et al. 2013). However, there is no guarantee that 
displaced fishers will be the ones to capture diversified benefits, though a centralized 
business plan or community-based management can take equity into account (Sala et al. 
2013).  
Marine reserves prohibit fishing effort in a designated space, and what happens to 
that effort depends on the biological and economic landscape of fishing opportunities and 
the ability of fishers to adapt. Here, I use a single-input model with a homogenous pool of 
effort. In reality, who gains and who is forced out of the fishery given a particular 
management combination depends on various factors that would take a model with 
heterogeneous agents fishing to disentangle.  However, that is unnecessary for the 
intuition offered by this analysis: that who gains from a marine reserve is not necessarily 
who gains from an ITQ, and the combination of the two may leave everyone worse off. 
Instead of layers on a delightful cake, I would suggest a better analogy would be a spicy 
seven-layer bean dip. Management strategies that seem tasty and wholesome on their 
own, can come together to leave you with a bad taste in your mouth, and regrets the 
following morning. 
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CHAPTER 3. WHAT HAPPENS IN A MARINE RESERVE DOESN‘T ALWAYS 
STAY IN A MARINE RESERVE: HUMAN USE MATTERS FOR ACCURATE 
BIOLOGICAL EVALUATION  
3.1 Introduction 
Meta analyses of no-take marine reserves show rapid and lasting biological 
increases within five years in tropical and temperate environments for a range of species 
(Halpern and Warner 2002; Lester et al. 2009; Babcock et al. 2010). These analyses show 
direct and indirect positive biological responses to marine reserves often without a 
temporal lag, even with slow-growing species (Halpern and Warner 2002; Babcock et al. 
2010). No-take marine reserves function by protecting stock and habitat within reserve 
boundaries from extractive activities. A reduction in fishing pressure cannot immediately 
increase existing stock abundance within a reserve, and there must be a temporal lag 
associated with larval recruitment. One explanation for the rapidly (though not 
immediately) observed increase in stock post-reserve is adult immigration and 
colonization due to life history characteristics and behavior of specific species (Denny et 
al. 2004). However, another more general rationale is that the human-use landscape 
changes immediately in response to an institutional shift (Fujitani 2010; Fujitani et al. 
2012; Abbott and Haynie 2012). If a reserve changes spatial patterns of fishing pressure, 
the human use responses can create the appearance of rapidly observed biological 
changes, despite insufficient passage of time for sedentary, slow-growing and 
reproducing species to respond directly to reserve protection. Alternately, some reserves 
show no effect on protected species, despite decades of operation and monitoring 
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(Halpern and Warner 2002; Babcock et al. 2010). A lack of change could indicate a lack 
of protection; that is, the reserve institution may not reduce harvest (Guidetti et al. 2008; 
Babcock et al. 2010; Fujitani et al. 2012). However, the baseline for comparison in 
conjunction with the reserve-biological and human-use system dynamics may make it 
difficult to detect an effect of the reserve on protected stocks (Underwood 1992; 1994). 
Previous work on this topic focused on larval dispersal as the dominating force 
confounding detection of a reserve effect, while employing simplifying assumptions of 
human use dynamics (proportional effort displacement; Halpern et al. 2004). I use a bio-
economic model to focus on how more realistic human responses to marine reserves 
confound accurate detection of reserve effects. I use a management strategy evaluation 
(MSE; Sainsburry et al. 2000) style stochastic simulation of a marine reserve and a 
monitoring program to demonstrate that coupled human-ecological dynamics such as 
fishing displacement can lead to a misleading picture of a reserve‘s biological 
performance. 
The importance of monitoring to detect reserve effects (Roberts et al. 2001; Russ 
and Alcala 2003) in order to inform future management decisions involving ecological 
conservation, economic sustainability, and social justice (Castilla 2000; Mascia 2003; 
Gerber et al 2005; Grafton and Kompas 2005) is well-established. Without accurate 
monitoring a reserve cannot be evaluated and tuned to meet biological and social goals. 
Creating and maintaining a reserve is not free, and it is in the best interest of management 
to evaluate their return on investment. 
The aim in monitoring is to discern the causal biological effect of a reserve by 
looking at the statistical difference between spatially or temporally ‗treated‘ reserve and 
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‗untreated‘ non-reserve units. However, with controlled, randomized experiments only 
the treatment varies systematically among subjects, and due to the randomization process, 
all other variation is unrelated noise that is assumed to sum to zero (in a sufficiently large 
sample). This assumption often fails to hold for a treatment that occurs non-randomly and 
is imposed on subjects in nature (Rubin 1974; Hurlbert 1984). For example, outstanding 
characteristics of conservation importance (UNEP-WCMC 2008), ecological criteria 
(Roberts et al. 2003), or opportunity (Roberts 2000; Hansen et al. 2011) often influence 
the sites chosen as marine reserves.  Furthermore cost and political considerations 
prevent marine reserves from being placed randomly.  Therefore, any analysis to detect 
the causal effects of a marine reserve is not a true randomized experiment, but instead a 
‗quasi-experiment‘ (Cambell and Stanley 1963; Rubin 1974). 
In the ecological literature quasi-experiments are evaluated using some variation 
of Before-After Control-Impact (BACI) analysis (Green 1979, Stewart-Oaten et al. 
1986), also known in the social science literature as the difference in differences (DD) 
model (Orley & Card, 1985). For example, abundance is monitored at a site (Figure 1; 
blue) before a reserve is created and after. A control site (Figure 1; red) is also monitored. 
Stock abundance at the control and reserve sites vary over time and at different rates, but 
the difference between these differences (i.e. the interaction between change over time 
and treatment; BAxCI) is the treatment effect.  This methodology is superior to analyses 
that use only Before-After or Control-Impact data, as it helps account for unobserved 
covariates other than the treatment (Stewart-Oaten et al. 1986). In this illustration, if we 
only compared Before-After data, the analysis would find an artificially inflated reserve 
effect on abundance (Figure 1).  
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Though the above illustration is clear-cut, influential papers in both the biological 
(Hurlbert 1984; Stewart-Oaten et al. 1986) and economics (Hendry 1980; Leamer 1983) 
literatures highlight the complexities of employing quasi-experiments for causal 
inference in real world situations. Omission of important control variables can lead to 
incorrect imputation of correlation as causality, or even produce a spurious treatment 
effect (Heckman 1979; Hurbert 1984; Heckman and Robb 1985). Two key assumptions 
that must be met to employ BACI/DD methodology are 1) that there are no shocks to the 
control area concurrent with the treatment, and 2) that the control and treatment sites do 
not directly or indirectly influence each other (Stewart-Oaten et al. 1986; Underwood 
1992). These assumptions are problematic given biological connectivity, and in human-
ecological systems connectivity through human use must also be considered (Berkes and 
Folke 1998).  
Reserves directly affect human behavior, and only indirectly affect the ecosystem 
by alleviating harvest pressure (Fujitani et al. in prep). Despite this, the evaluation of 
reserve effects has focused overwhelmingly on biological criteria (Halpern & Warner 
2002; Halpern 2003; UNEP-WCMC 2008; Lester et al. 2009; Babcock et al. 2010). 
Assumptions simplifying or omitting human behavior in a reserve system can lead to 
overly sanguine model predictions of reserve success (Chapter 1; Smith and Wilen 2003; 
Smith et al. 2006; Byers and Noonburg 2007). Human use affects stock levels through 
fishing pressure, and as people move across the landscape of costs and fishing 
opportunities, they can have strong and wide-reaching influence (Hunt et al. 2011). A key 
assumption of BACI/DD methodology is isolation between the reserve and control sites 
(Stewart-Oaten et al. 1986). Even if a reserve and a control site can be chosen to be 
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completely biologically independent, the sphere of human use connectivity covers the 
entire area that fishers are willing to travel to fish and potentially beyond through market 
interactions (Horan and Shortle 1999). If the creation of the marine reserve perturbs the 
trajectory of human use over time at the control site, then the treatment effect will be 
biased. For example, if fishers displace effort from the reserve into the site monitored as 
the control, stock in the control site would be depressed. In comparison, the reserve 
would appear to have a rapid increase in stock, above what is actually due to the 
treatment effect of the reserve, biasing towards the detection of an effect. Halpern et al. 
(2004) suggested that due to larval export, marine reserves created a bias against 
detecting a treatment effect that swamped fishery effort displacement. Using data from 
seven studies of nine separate reserves they found the majority of control areas increased 
their biological indices (e.g. abundance, biomass, diversity) after the reserve went into 
place compared with before (Halpern et al. 2004). However, as shown in Figure 1, there 
could be some underlying trend independent of the marine reserve that increases 
abundance in both control and reserve sites, rendering before-after comparisons 
meaningless. Instead of simply observing biological changes in the control, if there is a 
suspicion that human use reallocation from the reserve affects the control, monitoring 
those human use changes directly would help resolve uncertainty. 
I model the scientific evaluation of simulated marine reserves using BACI/DD 
analysis, for coupled human-ecological systems, and show that where there is flexibility 
to allow displacement of fishing effort outside reserves there can be bias in reserve 
evaluation. I then demonstrate how monitoring human use can dispel these biases. 
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Figure 3-1. Detection of treatment effects with Before-After-Control-Impact / difference 
in differences methodology. 
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3.2 Methods 
The management strategy evaluation-style analysis (Sainsburry et al. 2000) of a 
stochastic bio-economic system is composed of three parts, which is represented in a 
conceptual model (Figure 2). The first part is a deterministic metapopulation biological 
stock model with three spatial patches.  One patch is designated to become a marine 
reserve, and a second patch serves as the control for comparison. The third patch is a 
stand-in for the rest of the system.  Coupled to the biological model is a deterministic 
economic model of fishers who choose patches (or whether or not) to fish to maximize 
private net revenue given costs (Sanchirico and Wilen 1999). The final part of the model 
incorporates sources of uncertainty in simulating a biological evaluation process, where 
the stock are monitored over a time series with observation error, and a BACI/DD 
analysis is performed on observed stock levels. I subsequently add to this a human use 
monitoring program, which tracks effort changes in the reserve and control patches, along 
with catch per unit effort (CPUE).  
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Figure 3-2. Conceptual model of simulated system 
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3.2.1 Biological Sub-model 
Discrete stock (Xt) growth in each patch is modeled with the Ricker function 
(Ricker 1954) at time t,  
 (  )      
     
 
Parameters from the Ricker function are mapped to the logistic growth model     and 
  
 
 
, so that            
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))
, so that r is the intrinsic growth rate and biological 
carrying capacity K. K is a proxy for environmental quality of a particular patch, and thus 
its biological productivity; it is the maximum stock size for a given patch. The meta-
population model with connectivity and harvest for each patch i represented as: 
         (         ∑        
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    is the portion of stock in patch i that stays in patch i, while     is the portion moving 
into patch i from patch j. Quantity and rate of migration between patches depends on the 
between-patch differentials in the ratio of stock level in a patch and that patch‘s carrying 
capacity as compared to a neighboring patch, as in passive diffusion down a gradient. 
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The parameter b is the rate that stock movement can occur, a proxy for life history 
characteristics of the representative fish species (e.g. sedentary versus highly mobile) and 
environmental characteristics in the simulated system (current speed and direction, 
distance between habitable patches). Connectivity configurations modeled between the 
three patches are shown in Figure 3. In the conceptual model (Figure 2) fully integrated 
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mixing is given as the example (Figure 3; B). I also modeled the patches as  isolated with 
no connectivity (Figure 2; A), and as a linear cascade (Figure 2; C) where stock still 
disperse according to density dependence, but only between patches designated as 
adjacent. In nature, a linear cascade of patches or a patch as a source can occur due to 
geographic (e.g. along a coastline) or oceanographic features (e.g. strong currents, 
upwelling areas), but can also occur if the patches are nested spatially. 
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Figure 3-3. Three-patch connectivity configurations: patch 1 is designated as a reserve.  
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3.2.2 Economic Sub-model 
Economic fishing behavior is modeled with a Schaefer harvest function,     
     , of the catchability coefficient, q, and the stock size and effort E. The discrete time 
analog used is written (Conrad 1999): 
      (         )      (     
(     )),         
Net revenues from fishing in a patch depend on catch, price per unit of catch,  , 
and the cost associated with fishing.  
  (         )   (        )  (    )    ,         
   is the cost to fish in a particular patch, which depends on site characteristics such as the 
distance of the patch from port.   is cost per unit effort, such as operating costs and the 
opportunity cost of fishing rather than pursuing employment elsewhere. Only variable 
costs (per unit effort) are represented in the model. The fixed costs in the fishery would 
be modeled as an additional scaling constant.  Given private net revenues available after 
costs, the homogenous pool of fishers allocate their fishing effort according to 
           (         )  ∑    [  (         )    (         )]
 
   
   
,         
Fishers move into patches that yielded higher private net revenues in the previous time 
step, and leave patches or the fishery if no private net revenues are available.    is the rate 
that fishers can enter and leave the fishery, and     is the rate at which fishers can switch 
harvest between patches (Smith 1968; Sanchirico and Wilen 1999). Harvest is coupled to 
biological stock growth and migration:  
         (         ∑        
 
   
   
)      , for all         
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 Fisheries management including marine reserve implementation are modeled as in 
chapter 1, employing representative ‗flexible‘ and ‗rigid‘ management. Under ‗rigid‘ 
management scenarios such as open access, regulated open access, and landing taxes, 
when a reserve closes an area to fishing, effort displaced from the reserve exits the 
fishery unless there is adult or larval stock spillover from the reserve. This is most clear 
in cases when a reserve protected sedentary species in an open access regime, such as 
with the Sinai Bedouin mollusk fishery in Egypt (Ashworth et al. 2004). Reserves are 
frequently employed in areas governed by regulated open access, some with strong 
reserve and weak fishery management institutions (e.g Russ et al. 2004), but also with 
weak management institutions overall (e.g. Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009) and likely de facto 
open access. ‗Flexible‘ management institutions, such as limited access and ITQs, allow 
for post-reserve adjustment; fishers displaced from the reserve can shift their effort to 
areas outside the reserve even without adult and larval spillover. Some examples of 
reserves operated in conjunction with limited access and ITQs can be found in the U.S., 
Europe, Australia, and New Zealand (Babcock et al. 1999; Edgar and Barrett 1999; 
Paddack and Estes 2000; Guidetti et al. 2008).  
3.2.3 Scientific Evaluation Model 
 Scientific sampling methodology is simulated with stochastic draws from a 
normal distribution of 10 ‗transects‘ with mean values from deterministic stock levels 
simulated from the bioeconomic model. Different degrees of classical observation error 
were simulated using different coefficients of variation, a unitless measure of variation 
that is the standard deviation normalized by the mean. Coefficients of variation (CVs) for 
marine transect monitoring range within standard rates in the ecological literature 
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(Gerrodette 1987; Cheal and Thompson 1997; 1-40%). However, marine systems under 
some monitoring regimes can have CVs up to 300% (Cole 2003), With CVs up to 40% 
five years of annual monitoring may be sufficient to detect the same level of changes that 
necessitate over 15 years of monitoring with CVs of 300% (Cole 2003). The CV is a 
proxy for the precision of monitoring undertaken by reserve management, for example 
the experience and consistency of transect divers, and the number, size, and quality of 
replicates. Higher CVs attenuate the detected effect sizes to zero. We use low (5%), 
medium (10%; 25%), high (40%) and very high (300%) CVs to simulate 10 observed 
‗transects‘ from a zero-truncated normal distribution with mean taken from the 
deterministic population size     . Transects are averaged to obtain a population estimate 
in each time step from the reserve and control sites.  
Stochastic reserve monitoring data are simulated for ten consecutive years before 
and after the reserve is implemented. Using those twenty years of simulated data, the 
model compares observed stock levels in the reserve and control site in a BACI/DD 
analysis to detect a significant difference (p < 0.05). This process of simulating coupled 
system responses to a reserve and a scientific analysis is repeated iteratively 10,000 times 
for each coefficient of variation in each scenario to determine a percentage of times a 
treatment effect can be accurately detected under the prescribed conditions.    
 Following the initial modeling exercise, I add a human use monitoring program. 
Spatial tracking of human use is made cost-effective by satellite vessel monitoring 
systems (VMS) that are in use globally (FAO 2014).  Intensity of effort can be 
determined with catch per unit effort (CPUE), the most commonly collected metric used 
in stock assessment (Maunder et al. 2006). With VMS data that can quantify effort 
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combined with knowledge of the CPUE, management effort change in the reserve versus 
control patches, calculates the harvest that was taken from the control patch, and adds it 
back to the count of stock in the control site before performing the BACI. As above, 
stock counts are subject to observation error with previously stated CVs, and 10,000 
Monte Carlo simulations are conducted.  
3.3 Results 
 Whether or not effort can displace out of the reserve has important implications 
for biological outcomes, as outlined in the previous chapter; this is also true for the 
detection of a treatment effect. The BACI/DD monitoring works well under management 
regimes termed ‗rigid‘ in the previous chapter. With no stock spillover, effort displaced 
from the reserve also leaves the fishery, and there is no change in stock levels outside the 
reserve. With stock migration, there is stock spillover from the reserve, and some effort 
from the reserve is displaced to other patches. However, net stock levels in outside 
patches stay constant at pre-reserve levels because that is the level of fishing where 
private net revenues equal costs. The BACI/DD analysis of the reserve impact on stock 
within the reserve patch will not be biased by stock or fishing effort spillover. The only 
considerations for biological reserve evaluation under ‗rigid‘ management is that if the 
stock is well managed and near biological carrying capacity pre-reserve, stock gains due 
to the reserve may be small, and difficult to differentiate from the pre-reserve baseline as  
higher monitoring CVs attenuate effect sizes to zero (Figure 4).  
 Now consider ‗flexible‘ management regimes (Chapter 1; e.g. ITQ and limited 
access).  Flexible regimes allow for effort to displace outside the reserve, even without 
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stock spillover.  If effort is displaced and stock outside the reserve is fished down as a 
consequence, a BACI/DD analysis has the tendency to exaggerate the treatment effect, as 
the positive change in the reserve patch is compared to the negative change in the control 
patch (Figure 5D). The reserve and control patches are not independent in these 
scenarios, even if the patches are biologically isolated (as in Figure 5B and C). If there is 
spillover from the reserve, the stock increase inside the reserve may be small (Figure 5A), 
but as long as stock spillover does not completely compensate this effort spillover, the 
treatment effect will appear larger than it actually is to the monitoring program (Figure 
5D). With no or low spillover, fishing displaced outside the reserve can push it to de-
facto open access; with the large difference between before-after and control-impact it 
becomes more likely to reject the null hypothesis of no reserve effect as can be seen in 
Figure 6 compared to equivalent reserve stock effects without fishing displacement 
(Figure 4).   
While a greater likelihood of detecting an existing reserve effect may be viewed 
as positive, note that the spillover of effort does not increase an observers power to detect 
a true treatment effect—it causes an additional effect that is incorrectly attributed to the 
treatment and exaggerates the treatment effect (Figure 5D).  Further, there is the potential 
for false positives. Figure 5C shows a scenario with no migration out of the reserve, and 
no actual reserve treatment effect. This can occur where fishing pressure is not the 
dominant process inhibiting stock recovery (Lester et al. 2009). In Figure 5C, despite the 
fact that there is no actual treatment effect, a spurious treatment effect is detected because 
displaced fishing effort depresses stock in the control patch. The probability of falsely 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no reserve effect given different levels of observation 
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error is seen in Table 1. The reserve is overwhelmingly observed to have a positive effect 
on stocks in the reserve patch, even with a great deal of observation error. In addition, 
depression of stock in the control site due to effort displacement can mask a reduction in 
stock in the reserve patch post-reserve (Figure 7A). This can be the case if poaching or 
quota busting (where a fisher illegally exceeds their quota; Copes 1986) occurs in a 
reserve in an area otherwise managed by limited access or ITQ (e.g. Paddack and Estes 
2000; Taylor and Buckenham 2003; Guidetti et al. 2008). The BACI/DD process will 
statistically view the reserve to have dampened an overall trend of stock decline (Figure 
7B), the biological monitoring program has a high probability of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no positive reserve effect on the stock (Table 1).  
 Characteristics of the control site also matter for the detection of the treatment 
effect of a reserve. Assuming there is variation in the cost of fishing in specific patches 
due to fuel costs for more distant patches and other patch-specific fishing costs, more 
costly patches, all else equal, will be fished less. In situations where fishers displaced 
from a reserve can switch to other sites (e.g. limited access/quota management systems) 
the choice of site for control, its relative cost, and the dispersal dynamics matter. Figure 8 
shows both a fully mixed (Figure 2B) and cascade (Figure 2C) dispersal scenario with 
patch 2 six times as costly to fish as patch 3.  When the reserve is instituted, the higher 
level of stock in patch 2 is fished down more heavily than patch 3. That is, the difference 
between ‗before‘ and ‗after‘ is greater in patch 2 than in patch 3 (Figure 8). Thus, if patch 
3 is chosen as the statistical control, the reserve effect would be exaggerated less than if 
patch 2 was selected. Under the ‗linear cascade‘ migration scenario (Figure 2; C), all else 
equal, the difference between before and after in patch 2 versus patch 3 is even more 
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pronounced (Figure 8A vs. 8B). Parameterizations for Figure 8A and 8B are identical 
except for stock dispersal configuration; parameters were chosen to illustrate a case 
where stock export out of patch 1 is such that that there is no biological change in the 
patch due to the reserve (Figure 8B). Despite there being no reserve effect on stock 
abundance within the reserve patch, the monitoring program will detect a positive 
treatment effect due to stock depression in the control. Further, the probability of 
spuriously rejecting the null hypothesis of no treatment effect depends upon whether site 
2 or 3 is selected as a control (Table 2).  
 Finally, we look at the potential for human use monitoring to resolve some of the 
bias caused by effort displacement. When harvest from effort displacement is accounted 
for, in scenarios where the true reserve treatment effect is zero (Figure 5C; 8B) the 
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis is 0.05 (Table 1), which 
corresponds to the p-value set for the analysis. The sign on the spuriously detected 
treatment effects are, as can be expected, split evenly between positive and negative. 
With the scenario illustrated in Figure 7, despite stock reduction in the reserve post-
implementation, due to effort displacement outside the reserve there is a high probability 
of incorrectly detecting a positive reserve treatment effect (Table 1). Once human use 
monitoring is instituted, there is an extremely low probability of incorrectly concluding 
the reserve is having a positive effect, and a higher probability of correctly detecting the 
negative reserve treatment effect.  
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Figure 3-4. Given ‗rigid‘ management with no effort displacement, the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no change given changes in reserve stock before and after 
reserve implementation under different coefficients of variation. 
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Figure 3-5. Stock and effort responses to a marine reserve under ‗flexible‘ management. 
In (A) stock are allowed free migration between patches along the diffusion gradient of 
their relative stock proportions of carrying capacity at rate (b = 0.9). (B) and (C) have no 
stock migration. (C) illustrates the case where there is no change due to the marine 
reserve besides fishing displacement. Stock (X) and effort (E) levels in patches 1 through 
3 are shown before (grey) and after (black) the creation of a reserve in patch 1. (D) shows 
the stock changes in the reserve and control patches from the before to after period, and 
the treatment effect that would be detected. 
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Figure 3-6. Given a ‗flexible‘ management scenario as in Figure 5B where displaced 
fishing depresses stock in the control, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no change given changes in reserve stock before and after reserve implementation under 
different coefficients of variation. 
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Figure 3-7. (A) Poaching in a reserve (patch 1), effort displacement into the control site 
(patch 2) and the effect on stock (X) and effort (E). (B) illustrates how this scenario will 
be analyzed by a BACI/DD analysis. 
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Figure 3-8. Stock and effort responses to a marine reserve under a limited access/ 
individual tradable quota system where the cost of fishing in patches 1 and 2 is six times 
as high as fishing in patch 3.  In (A) stock migrate along a cascade with a high migration 
rate and in (B) stock are allowed free migration between patches along the diffusion 
gradient of their relative stock proportions of carrying capacity at a high stock migration 
rate. Stock (X) and effort (E) levels in patches 1 through 3 are shown before and after the 
creation of a reserve in patch 1. Blue bars show differences in the reserve and potential 
control patches between the before and after reserve periods. 
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Figure 3-9. Example of a ‗flexible‘ management regime with effort 
displacement into the control site and identical effect on stocks without a 
latent trend (A) and with a latent trend (B; black).   
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Table 3-1. Probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis of no reserve effect in the 
scenario illustrated in Figure 5C, with and without human use monitoring, and the 
probability of incorrectly detecting a positive reserve treatment effect in the scenario 
illustrated in Figure 7 with and without human use monitoring. 
CV Figure 5C 
Figure 5C 
with 
human use 
monitoring 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 with human use 
monitoring 
  
Prob. of 
incorrectly 
rejecting 
null 
Prob. of 
incorrectly 
rejecting 
null 
Prob of 
incorrectly 
detecting 
positive effect 
Prob of 
incorrectly 
detecting 
positive 
effect 
Prob of 
correctly 
detecting 
negative 
effect 
0.05 1.0000 0.0494 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.1 1.0000 0.0473 1.0000 0.0000 0.8397 
0.25 1.0000 0.0486 1.0000 0.0002 0.4317 
0.4 1.0000 0.0502 1.0000 0.0010 0.2028 
3 0.972 0.052 0.942 0.010 0.058 
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Table 3-2. Probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis of no reserve effect using 
different patches as controls in the scenarios illustrated in Figure 8. 
CV 
Patch 2 
as 
control 
Patch 3 
as 
control 
0.05 1 1 
0.10 1 0.9996 
0.25 1 0.598 
0.40 0.9988 0.2862 
3.00 0.3882 0.0832 
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3.4 Discussion 
The importance of explicitly recognizing and managing ‗social-ecological 
systems‘ has become more common in the ecological literature (Turner et al. 2003; 
Ostrom 2009; Pollnac  et al. 2010; Horan et al. 2011).  I have demonstrated the 
importance of considering the dynamic interplay between human use and the 
environment when monitoring and evaluating management interventions. Under ‗rigid‘ 
management structures (open access, regulated open access, landing tax), effort does not 
displace post reserve, and thus the detection of a reserve effect is not biased by the human 
reaction to reserve policy. As monitoring program functions correctly and the greater the 
stock recovery, the more likely the BACI/DD evaluation program is to reject the null 
hypothesis of no reserve effect (Figure 4). Scenarios smaller pre-post reserve stock 
differentials occur with stronger regulations (e.g. a higher landing tax) due to greater 
initial stock levels. Reserves are frequently used in tandem with open access or weak 
regulated open access regimes in areas lacking strong institutional control of fisheries 
(Agardy 1997; National Research Council 2001). If a marine reserve in these conditions 
were to serve its protective function, and stock rebounded from a deteriorated state a 
BACI/DD analysis would detect a reserve treatment effect without bias.  
With effort displacement under ‗flexible‘ fisheries management strategies, it is 
possible to incorrectly detect a positive reserve effect when there is no biological change 
within the reserve (Figure 5C; 8B) or even when stock in the reserve are worse off post-
reserve (Figure 7). The reserve effect can be exaggerated or falsely detected (Table 1). 
Selecting an independent control is the ideal solution to these problems. Even when this 
is impossible, the selection of a control is still important. Intuition may lead one to think 
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that selecting an area that is costly to fish as a control is a good idea, as there will be less 
effort displacement due to the cost. However, I have demonstrated this is not always the 
case (Figure 8). A costly patch is fished less in the ‗before reserve‘ period, which allows 
stock in costly patches to be greatly depleted by displaced fishers post-reserve relative to 
less costly patches. 
The marine reserve literature is fruitful territory for introspection on quasi-
experiments: a retrospective review found this literature replete with poorly designed, 
unreplicated studies (Willis et al 2003).  A recent meta-analysis demonstrating 
widespread reserve success included Before-After as well as Control-Impact 
comparisons, and noted a need for more rigorous data collection as BACI/DD studies 
were rare (Lester et al. 2009). I have demonstrated that even with BACI/DD 
methodology, bias is present when human behavior is not accounted for. Halpern et al. 
(2009) suggested that bias due to fishing displacement could be checked for by observing 
whether the biological metrics at the control site decreased after reserve implementation 
compared to before. However, even if biological metrics are observed to increase in the 
control site after compared to before reserve implementation, that is no guarantee that 
fishing effort displacement did not occur and stock in the control site were not affected. 
There could be some latent trend (e.g. ENSO) positively affecting both the control and 
reserve areas identically (Figure 9).  Fishing effort displaced into a control site could 
deplete stock below levels that would have existed without the additional fishing 
pressure, but in absolute terms the biological metrics in the control site would appear to 
have increased over time. The BACI/DD methodology would control for the latent trend 
but not for the effort displacement, and there would be bias toward detecting a positive 
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effect of the reserve.  For the purposes of BACI/DD analysis, the case illustrated in 
Figure 9 is identical to those in Figures 5C and 8B.  
For every modeled scenario where fishing is displaced into the control site, an 
increase in effort can be observed (e.g. Figure 5). Some of the bias towards detecting a 
reserve effect can be mitigated by monitoring fishing effort changes in the reserve and 
control site before versus after the reserve is implemented. By monitoring effort and 
CPUE we can account for the additional harvest from effort displacement in a ‗flexible‘ 
management regime (Table 1). However, unless we are able to track all effort in the 
system perfectly, this is essentially a before-after comparison of effort, which inevitably 
suffers from the same problems as any before-after comparison. Yet, in the absence of a 
truly independent control, monitoring human use would provide managers with 
additional information about the system and resolve some uncertainty. Indeed, 
monitoring human use would provide information on whether the reserve is working to 
reduce fishing pressure (Fujitani et al. 2012), and thus if it can mechanistically be 
expected to give rise to a positive reserve treatment effect. If illegal fishing were 
detected, resources could be shifted towards reducing implementation error. 
Marine reserves are an apropos illustration of a policy instrument applied to a 
complex non-replicable system. Once a reserve has been established we can never know 
how the ecology and structure of human use in a region would have developed without a 
reserve.  Neither can we replicate the biological and social systems that were affected by 
the creation of the reserve, to serve as a control. Thus, we must rely on quasi-experiments 
to determine the treatment effects of a marine reserve. I have provided specific examples 
of where the coupled dynamics of human-ecological systems may impede accurate 
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reserve evaluation. Poor reserve evaluation could jeopardize conservation objectives. 
Reserve enforcement is not free, and capital, both political and financial, are wasted if 
reserves are incorrectly analyzed to be achieving biological goals. Further, we lose 
valuable information that could have been generated by proper quasi-experiments on 
reserve placement and coupled human-ecological system dynamics.  Managers can 
incorporate human use monitoring in tandem with biological monitoring, to understand 
how human use shifts due to a reserve. They can also adjust their sampling 
methodologies to select control sites for not only biological but economic characteristics. 
Finally, they can be vigilant for the possibility of false positives in their interpretations of 
monitoring results to ensure accurate and thus useful reserve evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 4. FINDING FUNCTIONAL FINES IN RESPONSE TO RECREATIONAL 
ANGLER REACTIONS TO RESERVES 
4.1 Introduction 
Rules and restrictions that limit the amount of resource taken in a given amount of 
time are frequently enforced with a fine.  For example, the penalty for exceeding the 
recreational catch limit in the U.S. for some highly migratory species can exceed $200 
per fish (NOAA Office of General Counsel 2013). Theory and empirical evidence 
indicate that behavior is deterred when the expected cost to the user (e.g. from enforced 
fines) exceeds the expected value of resource extraction (Becker 1968; Sutinen & 
Andersen 1985). However, finding an appropriate level of fine is challenging; work by 
Firey (1960) and extended by Clawson (1975) outlined several conditions for the 
successful adoption and long-term retention of management practices: physical 
feasibility, operational or administrative practicality, economic efficiency, economic 
equity, and social and cultural acceptability. Penalties that enforce controls on resource 
extraction must balance these often conflicting conditions (Shindler et al. 2002) , because 
management policies that do not are ultimately doomed to failure (Firey 1960; Clawson 
1975; Shindler et al. 1993). I use data on human behavioral responses to regulation to 
generate a range of fines that would be necessary to completely or partially protect a 
marine reserve.  The range of fines suggested by the data, and the corresponding effect of 
each level of fine on human behavior, is a tool to help assess the tradeoffs between 
biological, economic, and social goals, and reach a consensus. 
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Marine reserves are a prime example of a management strategy with the goals and 
challenges that accompany regulation. Reserves are widely advocated for both 
conservation and fisheries management under conditions of stock, harvest, and 
environmental uncertainty (Grafton & Kompas 2005; Castilla 2000).  No-take marine 
reserves (where extractive activities are prohibited) have demonstrated increases in 
biodiversity and abundance (Halpern & Warner 2002; Lester et al. 2009) compared to 
control areas.  Further, these stock enhancement benefits have been observed to ―spill 
over‖ reserve boundaries to support adjacent fisheries (Guidetti 2002; Roberts et al. 
2001). Yet, for all the focus on biological benefits, reserves are social constructs. Only if 
reserve management successfully restricts fishing and protect habitat can they become 
vehicles for biological change (Hilborn 2007; Fujitani et al. 2012). If violations are not 
penalized, regulations exist only on paper only and have no effect (Johnson & Vande 
Kamp 1996; Bruner et al. 2001; Guidetti et al. 2008). Reserves establish areas where 
certain activities are restricted (Lynch 2006) and alter the incentive structure for human 
users (Fenichel et al. 2013). Most commonly, incentives are adjusted by increasing the 
expected cost of fishing (Waters 1991), for example by reducing catchability (also known 
as fishing gear efficiency; Hilborn and Walters 1992) through a gear restriction, or 
discouraging visitation with a fine in the case of no-take marine reserves. This paper 
focuses on ―no-take‖ reserves (hereafter ―reserves‖) where all extractive activities are 
prohibited under threat of penalty (e.g. a monetary fine, seizure of property, 
incarceration).  
An initial critical challenge is determining the fine that will alter behavior in the 
desired manner. Theoretically, a fine that effectively deters an action confers a cost that 
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meets or exceeds the expected benefit of committing that act (Becker 1968). In the 
economic theory of crime, criminals are assumed rational, and their cost-benefit analysis 
includes the severity of the sanction, their personal wealth, and the expected probability 
of getting caught and penalized (Becker 1968; Erlich 1973). To state the theory simply, to 
a prospective criminal the expected cost of committing a crime is the penalty (e.g. the 
fine) times the expected probability of being caught. If the expected probability of being 
caught is very low, even a large fine will convey a small expected cost; empirical 
evidence supports the theory that increasing the probability of being caught or the fine 
reduces the criminalized behavior (Becker 1968; Erlich 1973; Furlong 1991; Bulte and 
van Kooten 1999; Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote 2001). I demonstrate how data on human use 
responses to regulation can be used to determine an effective fine. This information is the 
crucial first step for managers to balance varied policy goals in a systematic and 
transparent way. 
A large body of work within the economics of law enforcement literature is 
focused on economically efficient sanctions that maximize social welfare (Cooter and 
Ullen 1988; Posner 1992). Balancing biological needs, management structures, and social 
institutions to determine a fine that allows the reserve to maximize welfare is beyond the 
scope of this paper. I instead focus on determining a ―functional‖ fine – projecting the 
positive, empirically grounded, behavioral response of users to adjustments in the fine. 
Given knowledge of the effective fine to stop prohibited behavior (e.g. fishing in a 
marine reserve), the posted fine amount and the probability of enforcement can be altered 
by management adaptively to determine a working combination. However, levels of 
enforcement cannot always be altered freely because enforcement isn‘t free (Sutinen and 
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Andersen 1985; Carr 2000; Burke and Maidens 2004), A high level of enforcement may 
not be operationally feasible. Enforcement and processing costs also need to be figured in 
to the fine amount (Becker 1968). Operational constraints on enforcement seem to 
recommend higher fines for a biologically effective reserve that reduces fishing pressure. 
However, reduction in fishing pressure in and of itself is not the end goal of a marine 
reserve. A reserve is part of a larger management system with broader objectives that 
may include conserving biological resources, enhancing coastal communities, and 
managing sustainable fisheries (Christie et al. 2003). Though the increase in stock 
biomass that logically accompanies relief from fishing pressure could support broad 
management goals regarding community development, actual management 
implementation could run counter to these goals if fishing pressure is decreased through 
onerous fines. Heavy penalties such as steep fines or jail time for poaching can destroy 
lives and livelihoods (West et al. 2006). Further, fines may place a selective burden on 
specific stakeholder groups, for example by criminalizing longstanding (e.g. traditional) 
and/or subsistence activities (Fujita & Bonzon 2006; West et al. 2006). This may be 
viewed as the price of breaking the law, but fines perceived to be unjust or to threaten 
livelihoods can undermine the operation or existence of the regulations by increasing 
noncompliance, engendering manager-stakeholder conflict, affecting rates of 
enforcement, and becoming publicly and politically unpopular, along with being 
undesirable from a social justice standpoint (Fiallo and Jacobson 1995; Agardy et al. 
2003; Christie 2004; West et al. 2006). Harsh penalties enforced on members of a 
community can erode public support for management, support that is essential to the 
continued existence and effectiveness of a reserve (Fiallo and Jacobson 1995; Brechin et 
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al. 2002). If a law is not perceived as legitimate, then an elevated collective violation rate 
provides cover for individual violators and may increase social acceptance of the 
―criminal‖ behavior and lower enforcement effort and the probability of being punished. 
In addition, adverse public judgments can postpone, modify, prevent, or terminate any 
management action through legal challenges, lobbying legislators, local ballot initiatives, 
or unfavorable media publicity (Shindler et al. 1993).  
Both the fine and enforcement are subject to social, economic, and political 
constraints. There are also practical considerations. The effective upper bound for the fine 
is delimited by the segment of the population with the least ability to pay (Polinsky and 
Shavell 1991) and fines exceeding the wealth of who have the least will no longer be 
effective for them. Further, with higher penalties the probability of conviction is not 
completely independent of the severity of punishment, for example with higher burdens 
of proof for more onerous penalties. Thus, the lowest effective fine, given operational 
enforcement constraints may be the most useful information for management.  
I analyze a novel dataset following fishing trips taken by a recreational angling 
community in the midriff region of the Gulf of California, Mexico over a nine-year 
period from 2000-2008 to provide information that can help managers fine the lowest 
effective fine. These data record recreational angler responses to the creation of a marine 
reserve over part of a historically popular fishing site, San Pedro Mártir Island (SPMI, 
Figure 1), in 2005. I use the model describing fishing trip behavior to determine how 
creating a reserve over part of the site increased the expected cost of travel to that site, 
and use that information to infer the cost necessary to discourage travel to that. Since a 
fine operates by increasing the expected cost of a behavior (Becker 1968), this derived 
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cost can be interpreted as the level of enforced fine that would have been necessary to 
deter visits to the reserve. I also determine the number of expected fishing visits for 
different levels of fine. A level of fine based on observed behavior has the benefit of 
being reasoned rather than arbitrary, and can be set to accomplish specific management 
goals given known budget restrictions (e.g. for policing and outreach), allowing for 
balanced decision-making regarding biological goals given managerial capabilities and 
social justice considerations.   
4.2 Study Site 
 Historically, the midriff region of the Gulf of California (Figure 1) was very 
productive and biologically diverse.  Local fishers have reported reduced catch in recent 
years, ostensibly due to overfishing (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009).  The only sizable human 
settlement in the area is Bahia Kino (Figure 1), which hosts the largest recreational 
angling community in the region. The recreational fleet averaged 252 boats per year from 
2000 - 2008.  These anglers are semi-permanent residents from the United States and 
Canada and spend an average of nine months a year in Bahia Kino.  The most popular 
seasonal pelagic species for these anglers are yellowtail (Seriola lalandi) and dorado 
(Coryphaena hippurus), which return to the Gulf in winter and summer respectively.  
Anglers also fish coastal rocky reefs year-round for resident grouper and sea bass 
(Serranidae) and snapper (Lutjanidae).  Regular fishing derbies are held in the region, 
targeting grouper, sea bass, and snapper at well-established fishing sites including San 
Pedro Martir Island (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009). 
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On April 10, 2005 the waters surrounding San Pedro Martir Island (Site P, Figure 
1), a popular fishing site, began functioning as a marine reserve consisting of a 290 km
2
 
buffer zone and a rectangular core no-take zone of approximately 9 km
2 
(Figure 1).   No 
extractive activities are permitted in the no-take zone, but small-scale and recreational 
fishing is allowed in the buffer zone (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2002).  Though fishing is 
still permitted in some areas around SPMI and it is still legal to travel there to fish, the 
creation of the no-take zone reduced the value of travel to SPMI (at least temporarily; see 
Fujitani et al. 2012). The no-take reserve was created over what anglers perceived as one 
of the best fishing sites for preferred species and one of the main reasons for traveling to 
SPMI (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009; Fujitani 2010). SPMI is a popular fishing site, but is 
remote and exposed (65 km from each coast).  Furthermore, in high seas the trip is 
difficult and dangerous. Closure of a popular area for fishing reduced the value of making 
the long and involved trip to the island. Fujitani et al. (2012) found that the closure 
reduced visits to the island temporarily relative to a counterfactual scenario where the 
reserve had not been implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  77 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Map of the central Gulf of California and the location of Bahia Kino with 
respect to San Pedro Mártir and alternate fishing sites along the coast the Mexican 
mainland and Tiburon and San Esteban islands.  The light gray square surrounding San 
Pedro Mártir indicates the 290km
2
 buffer zone of the reserve, with the no-take zone 
(9km
2
) represented by the smaller black rectangle 
 
 
  78 
4.3 Data 
I synthesized a dataset from the logbooks of a volunteer search and rescue service, 
known as Rescue One, organized by the recreational anglers of Bahia Kino.  These data 
comprise a complete census of daily fishing site choices for the members of the 
community of recreational anglers over a nine-year period (2000-2008).  Rescue One has 
a dedicated VHF channel to track boaters in the event a water rescue becomes necessary.  
Upon embarking, boaters radio their planned destination(s) and their expected return 
time, and Rescue One volunteers check on each boat until it returns.  Anglers have strong 
incentives for accurate reporting because there are no official water rescue services.  
Variable weather conditions, frequent mechanical failures (M. Fujitani, unpublished 
data), and the lack of alterative rescue services lead almost every member of the Bahia de 
Kino recreational angling community to utilize Rescue One on every trip (J. Jerdee, 
personal communication).
4
   
The community logged 14,894 trips on Rescue One between 2000 and 2008.  Day 
fishing trips to one of six sites confirmed as popular fishing sites though community 
interviews and identified by nicknames and major landmarks are used in this study to 
analyze fisher behavior (Figure 1).  Recreational fishing day trips account for 81% of 
trips in the database. Regression results show that the number of day-trips per year 
remained steady over the time series (R
2
 = 0.12, F1,7=0.96, p=0.36). Summary statistics 
for the number of trips taken to each site show significant trends over year and indicate 
that visitation to the most heavily trafficked site, site T, and site F  (at the p < 0.1 level) 
                                                 
4
 Enforcement officials do not have access to these data.   
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declined over time, while visits increased to sites E and P (Table 1; Figure 2).  Spring is 
the most popular season for fishing and late summer is the least popular season (Figure 
3).  This is driven by weather and species composition among other factors. 
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Figure 4-2. Trips taken by anglers to each site annually for sites showing a significant 
trend in visitation over time (A; p < 0.05) and sites showing no significant visitation trend 
from 2000-2008 (B). Visits to site P and E increased over time, while visits to site T 
decreased. Visits to site F decreased over time, but at the p < 0.1 level. 
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Figure 4-3. Recreational angling day trips taken in each month from 2000-2008. 
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Table 4-1. Summary statistics and regression results for trends over time of trips taken to 
each of the six sites and boat-specific characteristics 
  
Regression results on trips over year     
Summary Statistics of  
Trips Taken to Each Site 
 
Slope Intercept p-value F-value  R2 
 
Average 
trips per 
year  
Proportion 
of Total 
Trips 
Site P 22.17 -44254.67 0.02 9.97 0.59 
 
167.33 0.13 
Site T -39.62 80095.47 0.02 9.20 0.57 
 
703.67 0.56 
Site F -12.12 24454.80 0.11 3.40 0.33  173.00 0.14 
Site W 6.13 -12194.87 0.50 0.50 0.07  96.33 0.08 
Site E 10.97 -21913.31 0.01 14.69 0.68  63.89 0.05 
Site X -0.93 1914.96 0.64 0.24 0.03 
 
44.56 0.04 
         
 
 
 
 
Boat-Specific Characteristics  Mean SD Min Max 
Boat number of active years fishing 6.176 2.766 1 9 
Boat trips taken per active year 
14.65 15.23 1 70 
Boat average aboard 
3.468 0.938 1 15 
Boat maximum recorded aboard 
6.319 2.438 1 19 
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4.4 Model 
Discrete choice models were originally used to understand consumer demand for 
products and modes of transportation (McFadden 1974; 1980), but are now a standard 
technique for estimating commercial and recreational fishing trip demand (e.g. Eales and 
Wilen 1986; Train 1998; Abbott and Wilen 2011) and for recreation demand in general 
(Champ et al. 2003). An individual or household selects an option that provides the 
highest level of utility (also termed ‗satisfaction‘; Fenichel et al. 2013) subject to 
constraints (i.e. budget); their choice from among a number of discrete choices with 
accompanying characteristics implicitly reveals trade-offs made among the different 
characteristics. The multinomial logit model is the most widely used of the discrete 
choice models (Train 2009), because of its simplicity and interpretability. In the logit 
model, utility is assumed independent identically distributed (iid) extreme value 
(McFadden 1974), and the model is consistent with utility maximization (Marschak 
1960).  I use a multinomial logit model of vessel-level choices to fish at one of six day-
use fishing sites, or to not take a fishing trip.   
Utility is an economic concept to represent a measurement of satisfaction and 
happiness. The indirect utility function that maximizes utility given choices and 
constraints can be written as: 
                        
Where      is utility of the occupants of boat b taking a trip to one of six sites or 
choosing not to take a trip (j) over choice occasion t;      is the mean utility for choice j 
during time t. Here I model the demand for single day trips to one of six sites, as well as 
the option not to take a trip (j), by the captain and passengers of sport fishing boats (b). 
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The average number of people aboard on a given trip in the data is 3.47 (SD=1.45), with 
a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 19 people recorded taking a trip on a single boat in 
the data. When multiple people travel together I assume there is a group decision-making 
process to maximize trip satisfaction for the group. There were 711 boats observed 
taking trips, and an average of 202 boats taking day fishing trips in a given year between 
2000 and 2008. All boats that took a trip in a given year were counted as eligible to fish 
that year. 711 boats over 3,287 days yields over two million choice occasions, and over 
16 million options over these choice occasions. For tractability of estimation a number of 
no-day-trip choices equal to the number of fishing day-trip choices (11,347) were 
randomly drawn without replacement for a representative sample of no-trip choices for 
the fleet. For robustness, the no-trip choices were drawn from 1) all days, hereafter 
referred to as ‗Dataset A‘ and 2) only days where at least one boat in the fleet chose to 
take a trip that day (Dataset B).  A total of 22,784 discrete choices by the occupants of 
individual vessels over the time series were used to estimate the model.  
I use McFadden‘s (1974) alternative specific conditional choice model, where the 
coefficients vary according to the alternative (one of six sites) relative to a baseline (the 
no-trip choice). The vertical vector   contains these estimated parameters explaining 
variation in the choice between traveling to any of the six sites.     contains the predictors 
influencing boat-occupant-level choices.  The vector    includes the cost of travel to each 
site divided by the number of people aboard a boat for a particular choice occasion t.  
Travel cost (USD) is calculated by taking the round-trip distance in nautical miles to each 
site, assuming a typical boat in the recreational angling fleet travels at four nautical miles 
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per gallon
5
, and multiplying that by the price per gallon of gas.  The average gas price in 
Mexico remained flat over the relevant time period due to government subsidies ($2.34 
per gallon; Figure 4). Cost is divided by number aboard to account for fuel cost-sharing 
among anglers, a common practice in this community (M. Fujitani pers. obs.). A squared 
and cubic term of this cost measure is included in the model.  
Daily maximum wind speed is included as a measure of weather and high seas 
and how that may affect the choice of where to travel or whether to take a trip. An 
interaction term between daily maximum wind speed as the cost of a trip is also included, 
as cost is a proxy for distance and weather may moderate the choice of how far to travel. 
As there is a significant trend in the number of trips to a given site over years as the total 
number of trips taken by the fleet remains constant, year is included as a slope value 
(Table 1), to account for regional level fish population changes or changes in catch rates 
over time.  Monthly indicator variables capture variation in fishing patterns (Figure 3) 
due to weather and the composition and abundance of fished species, as well as seasonal 
non-fishing opportunities.  An alternative specific dummy variable 0 ‗before‘ and 1 
‗after‘ (BA) the reserve went into effect on April 10, 2005 was included to show how 
visitation changed at all sites in the period after in comparison to the period before the 
reserve was introduced at SPMI. Unlike many datasets of this type, due to the nature of 
data collected (for rescue log purposes), I do not have time varying site-specific 
characteristics, such as catch rates. However, year and month in the model are 
                                                 
5
 http://www.yamaha-motor.com/assets/products/otb/bulletins/bulletin 
_2stroke_hpmidport_pro_str-476sf-115tlr.pdf 
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alternative-specific proxies, and the alternative-specific constants capture time-invariant 
differences in sites not captured by the model. 
  I use the available data to construct variables to introduce boat-level 
characteristics (summarized in Table 1). There are 711 individual boats in the dataset, 
and 382 are observed in Bahia Kino for a single year while 329 fish in Bahia Kino 
multiple years. Most of the boats only appear once in the data, therefore I did not use boat 
fixed effects. ‗Boat active years‘ is a count of the total number of years a vessel appears 
in our data.  This proxies familiarity with Bahia Kino region and community, as the boats 
that take trips every year in the time series are more likely to be long-term residents, 
many of whom have been fishing the region for decades. Because many vessels were 
fishing in the region before 2000, a dummy variable for whether a boat was observed in 
the data in the year 2000 is included; 223 boats fit into this category. I also include an 
interaction term between presence in the year 2000 and ‗boat active years.‘ ‗Boat trips 
per active year‘ provides a measure of avidity. Though a boat may appear in the dataset 
only once, it may belong to an avid fisher who annually fishes heavily in different 
regions.  ‗Boat maximum aboard‘ is the maximum number of people observed aboard a 
particular boat throughout the dataset.  This provides information about the size of the 
boat.  ‗Boat average aboard‘ is the average number of people reported aboard, and 
provides information about boat size and measures of how social a particular boat owner 
is. I also include ‗number aboard‘ on a specific trip. For no-trip occasions, I assume that 
the minimum number of people recorded taking a trip on a given boat do not take a trip 
on that occasion.      is boat-level (b) unobserved heterogeneity over time (t) and site (j). 
The choice probability for alternative j is: 
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Statistical modeling was done in Stata version 11.0 (StataCorp LP). The above 
model was fit to the full nine years of data, and the direction and magnitude of the 
coefficients were assessed 
I next fit the model to data for trips taken before the reserve around SPMI went 
into effect (before April 10, 2005). The model captured behavior driving trip choices in 
the ‗before‘ period (before the reserve was instituted), and described the propensity to 
travel to the different sites before the reserve existed. I then projected the model with the 
estimated coefficients over the data for the period after the reserve had gone into effect.  
That is, given a model of how anglers made choices in the ‗before‘ period, I projected 
what choices they would make when faced with characteristics of a choice occasion in 
the ‗after‘ dataset (e.g. wind, number of people aboard). These are assumed to be the 
choices they would have made, had nothing changed between the ‗before‘ and ‗after‘ 
reserve period. For simplicity, I term these projected choices ―expected‖ choices, because 
they are the choices I expect anglers to make had constraints remained constant and the 
reserve never existed. I compared these ―expected‖ choices to the trip choices the anglers 
actually made, termed ―actual‖ choices. I projected and compared expected and actual 
choices for the entire post-reserve period, and for individual years post-reserve.  
I found the observed and expected rates of site visitation post-reserve to SPMI 
differed, and the expected rate of visitation was higher than what actually occurred. In 
order to determine the ‗cost‘ that anglers would need to experience in order to spur that 
behavioral change, I took the model fit to the ‗before‘ dataset and conducted simulation 
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experiments where the cost to travel to the SPMI reserve was increased. I observed how 
the modeled propensity to visit SPMI changed in response to the added cost. 
After determining the additional cost necessary to reduce visits from the modeled 
expectation to actual observed levels, I modeled increases in travel cost to find the 
additional cost to travel such that the model projects less than 0.5 of a boat would travel 
to SPMI. I prepared a schedule of expected increases in travel costs that would be 
necessary to reduce and eventually eliminate visitation (defined as less than 0.5 boats 
visiting) to SPMI. I bootstrapped 1,000 random draws with replacement from the data 
and generated 95% confidence intervals to assess the uncertainty around these 
projections. 
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Figure 4-4. Gas prices in the US and Mexico in US dollars, from 2000-2008.  Mexican 
prices are shown in blue, US prices are given in red for comparison. 
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4.5 Results 
Coefficients estimated from the model fit over the nine years in datasets A and B 
are shown Table 2.  The no-trip option is used as the baseline for both models. Estimates 
align with summary statistics, intuition, and unpublished survey and interview data. 
Overall, trip cost, wind speed, and the interaction of the two have negative relationships 
with site choice compared to the baseline choice of no trip.  Site T, the most popular site 
is both close to the boat ramp and a sheltered trip. Compared to SPMI for example, it is 
more likely to be visited with greater wind and by boats with less experience in the region 
(fewer active years in the fleet). Visitation trends over time (year coefficient) for all sites 
are consistent with Table 1.  SPMI shows visitation increasing over time, and fewer trips 
in winter, the most dangerous season for sudden high seas (as consistent with Fujitani et 
al. 2012).  Compared to site T, boats that have been in the fleet longer (length of time in 
the fleet proxies for regional experience) and have a larger maximum number of people 
aboard (proxies for larger boats) are more likely to visit SPMI. 
Controlling for trends over time (year), there was a lower propensity to visit SPMI 
and site E after the reserve was implemented at SPMI; the propensity to visit all other 
sites went up following the establishment of the reserve (Table 2). Previous work 
suggested that at least part of the reduction in visitation to SPMI post-reserve is due to 
reserve implementation (transiently, and compared to the counterfactual scenario with no 
reserve; Fujitani et al. 2012). Sites F and T had an overall downward trend in visitation 
(Figure 2; Table 1) but controlling for that, these sites experienced greater visitation after 
the reserve was created. Sites E and W, like SPMI, have an upward trend of visitation 
over time, and controlling for this E and SPMI were visited less in the after reserve 
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period compared to before (Table 2). Site E was the most heavily visited in the spring, a 
season that SPMI is visited less, and is a distant, less frequently visited sites (Table 1) 
that is more sheltered to visit than SPMI.  
Coefficients on cost were of direct interest. Table 3 compares these cost-related 
coefficients from models fit to datasets A and B split in half before and after the reserve 
was implemented at SPMI. Travel cost has a negative relationship with travel, an effect 
that at first decreases with increasing cost (squared term) but then increases again with 
sufficiently large cost (cubic term). The interaction between cost and wind is negative
6
. 
Coefficients estimated are qualitatively consistent and similar between datasets A and B 
and are closer in value in the ‗after‘ period rather than ‗before.‘  
Out of sample projection was used to determine the modeled expectation of site 
choices in the ‗after‘ period (given angler behavior in the ‗before‘ period, including no 
reserve) and compared it to actual site choices. Because datasets A and B were similar, 
dataset B was used (no-trip choices only drawn from days when at least one boat in the 
fleet took a trip) to account for unobserved factors that may influence the no-trip decision 
on days when no boats in the fleet took fishing trips. The projected shares of trips to each 
site given a model with coefficients fit to ‗before‘ data and projected over ‗after‘ data 
predict greater visitation to SPMI, and sites W, and E than was observed, and predict less 
visitation to sites F, T, and X than was observed (Table 4).      
                                                 
6
 Wind, though included in the model is not included in Table 3 because it is not 
alternative-specific (as the interaction term between wind and cost is). 
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I used the model fit to the ‗before‘ data to project the expected amount of visits to 
SPMI if behavior hadn‘t changed from the ‗before‘ period and the reserve had never 
existed. I found the expected rate of visitation to SPMI under ‗before‘ behavior was 
higher than what actually occurred for all years (Figure 5). This follows a previous study 
showing the reserve reduced visits relative to the expected counterfactual scenario where 
a reserve never existed (Fujitani et al. 2012). Given that observed visits to SPMI were 
reduced compared to expected visits in this model, I used the model to determine the 
supplemental travel cost to SPMI that would be required to bring the expected level of 
visitation to the observed level in the post-reserve period using datasets A and B (Figure 
5). Finally, I project the necessary additional cost (that may be thought of as fines per 
boat, with 100% enforcement) necessary to reduce and eliminate visits to SPMI (Figure 
6).   
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Table 4-2. Coefficients estimated from the multinomial logit models of demand for 
recreational angling trips to six fishing sites in the Gulf of California, Mexico, and the 
choice not to take a trip. 
Dataset A: no trip choices drawn from all days 
Dataset B: no trip choices drawn 
from days any boat in the fleet 
took a fishing trip 
Log Likelihood= 
Pseudo 
R2=   
Log 
Likelihood= 
Pseudo 
R2=  
-19797.6 0.353   -20271.4 0.337  
       
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p-value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
       
Travel cost 
divided by 
number aboard 
-0.360 0.047 p<0.001 -0.388 0.048 p<0.001 
Squared 0.007 0.002 p<0.001 0.008 0.002 p<0.001 
Cubed 
-5.63E-05 1.79E-05 0.002 -5.73E-05 1.83E-05 0.002 
Travel cost x 
Wind 
-0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.004 
       
SPMI -352.485 55.687 p<0.001 -631.307 54.300 p<0.001 
Wind -0.072 0.025 0.003 -0.008 0.024 0.734 
Year 0.177 0.028 p<0.001 0.317 0.027 p<0.001 
After vs before -0.100 0.130 0.443 -0.502 0.129 p<0.001 
Jan -0.406 0.199 0.042 -0.566 0.203 0.005 
Feb 0.634 0.181 p<0.001 0.296 0.184 0.108 
Mar 0.892 0.176 p<0.001 0.460 0.178 0.01 
Apr 0.239 0.192 0.214 -0.143 0.195 0.464 
May 1.393 0.172 p<0.001 0.788 0.174 p<0.001 
Jun 1.339 0.174 p<0.001 0.909 0.176 p<0.001 
Aug -0.722 0.254 0.004 -0.327 0.259 0.207 
Sept -1.107 0.287 p<0.001 -0.678 0.290 0.019 
Oct -1.486 0.246 p<0.001 -1.489 0.248 p<0.001 
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Nov -1.992 0.268 p<0.001 -2.092 0.270 p<0.001 
Dec -1.239 0.239 p<0.001 -1.249 0.242 p<0.001 
Number aboard 
during a given 
trip 
1.260 0.076 p<0.001 1.244 0.077 p<0.001 
Boat active years 0.236 0.028 p<0.001 0.269 0.028 p<0.001 
Boat trips per 
active year 
0.125 0.004 p<0.001 0.121 0.004 p<0.001 
Boat max aboard 0.525 0.022 p<0.001 0.527 0.022 p<0.001 
Boat average 
aboard 
-2.288 0.068 p<0.001 -2.367 0.068 p<0.001 
Year 2000 1.114 0.231 p<0.001 0.491 0.225 0.029 
Boat active years 
x Year 2000 
-0.209 0.036 p<0.001 -0.153 0.036 p<0.001 
       
Site T 420.178 35.801 p<0.001 110.409 33.727 0.001 
Wind -0.046 0.015 0.003 0.023 0.015 0.114 
Year -0.209 0.018 p<0.001 -0.054 0.017 0.001 
After vs before 0.768 0.086 p<0.001 0.294 0.084 p<0.001 
Jan 0.451 0.124 p<0.001 0.303 0.126 0.016 
Feb 0.988 0.120 p<0.001 0.642 0.121 p<0.001 
Mar 1.193 0.116 p<0.001 0.770 0.118 p<0.001 
Apr 0.915 0.120 p<0.001 0.520 0.121 p<0.001 
May 1.448 0.115 p<0.001 0.847 0.116 p<0.001 
Jun 0.673 0.121 p<0.001 0.280 0.122 0.021 
Aug -0.899 0.167 p<0.001 -0.570 0.176 0.001 
Sept -0.465 0.157 0.003 -0.081 0.165 0.625 
Oct 0.662 0.124 p<0.001 0.660 0.127 p<0.001 
Nov 0.888 0.120 p<0.001 0.796 0.122 p<0.001 
Dec 0.420 0.126 0.001 0.397 0.128 0.002 
Number aboard 
during a given 
trip 
1.502 0.069 p<0.001 1.492 0.070 p<0.001 
Boat active years 0.228 0.018 p<0.001 0.247 0.018 p<0.001 
Boat trips per 
active year 
0.100 0.004 p<0.001 0.095 0.004 p<0.001 
Boat max aboard 0.459 0.017 p<0.001 0.465 0.016 p<0.001 
Boat average 
aboard 
-2.276 0.052 p<0.001 -2.354 0.051 p<0.001 
Year 2000 1.486 0.122 p<0.001 0.597 0.109 p<0.001 
Boat active years 
x Year 2000 
-0.279 0.021 p<0.001 -0.186 0.020 p<0.001 
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Site F 467.653 52.967 p<0.001 171.314 51.171 0.001 
Wind -0.093 0.015 p<0.001 -0.004 0.018 0.846 
Year -0.233 0.026 p<0.001 -0.084 0.026 0.001 
After vs before 0.789 0.133 p<0.001 0.381 0.130 0.004 
Jan 2.828 0.373 p<0.001 2.527 0.374 p<0.001 
Feb 3.190 0.372 p<0.001 2.697 0.372 p<0.001 
Mar 3.203 0.371 p<0.001 2.614 0.371 p<0.001 
Apr 2.411 0.378 p<0.001 1.888 0.378 p<0.001 
May 1.047 0.410 0.011 0.302 0.410 0.462 
Jun 0.837 0.430 0.051 0.320 0.430 0.457 
Aug -0.528 0.584 0.365 -0.189 0.585 0.747 
Sept -0.387 0.583 0.506 -0.178 0.586 0.761 
Oct -0.159 0.457 0.727 -0.276 0.458 0.546 
Nov 1.552 0.384 p<0.001 1.306 0.385 0.001 
Dec 2.093 0.380 p<0.001 1.939 0.381 p<0.001 
Number aboard 
during a given 
trip 
1.673 0.073 p<0.001 1.415 0.082 p<0.001 
Boat active years 0.473 0.028 p<0.001 0.497 0.028 p<0.001 
Boat trips per 
active year 
0.140 0.005 p<0.001 0.137 0.005 p<0.001 
Boat max aboard -0.478 0.037 p<0.001 -0.468 0.036 p<0.001 
Boat average 
aboard 
-2.116 0.087 p<0.001 -2.202 0.086 p<0.001 
Year 2000 1.343 0.193 p<0.001 0.484 0.182 0.008 
Boat active years 
x Year 2000 
-0.317 0.033 p<0.001 -0.232 0.032 p<0.001 
       
Site W -31.602 64.065 0.622 -321.318 62.716 p<0.001 
Wind -0.044 0.029 0.125 0.023 0.028 0.414 
Year 0.017 0.032 0.605 0.161 0.031 p<0.001 
After vs before 0.125 0.150 0.406 -0.306 0.149 0.04 
Jan 1.769 0.362 p<0.001 1.579 0.365 p<0.001 
Feb 1.853 0.362 p<0.001 1.484 0.364 p<0.001 
Mar 1.736 0.363 p<0.001 1.276 0.364 p<0.001 
Apr 1.437 0.374 p<0.001 1.028 0.375 0.006 
May 2.051 0.361 p<0.001 1.423 0.362 p<0.001 
Jun 1.458 0.375 p<0.001 1.020 0.376 0.007 
Aug -0.463 0.538 0.39 -0.124 0.542 0.819 
Sept -0.767 0.611 0.209 -0.387 0.614 0.528 
Oct 0.796 0.386 0.039 0.778 0.388 0.045 
Nov 2.112 0.358 p<0.001 1.991 0.360 p<0.001 
Dec 2.048 0.361 p<0.001 2.009 0.363 p<0.001 
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Number aboard 
during a given 
trip 
1.182 0.081 p<0.001 1.159 0.081 p<0.001 
Boat active years 0.437 0.032 p<0.001 0.461 0.032 p<0.001 
Boat trips per 
active year 
0.111 0.005 p<0.001 0.107 0.004 p<0.001 
Boat max aboard 0.466 0.028 p<0.001 0.467 0.027 p<0.001 
Boat average 
aboard 
-2.365 0.084 p<0.001 -2.441 0.083 p<0.001 
Year 2000 1.527 0.281 p<0.001 0.790 0.275 0.004 
Boat active years 
x Year 2000 
-0.373 0.042 p<0.001 -0.301 0.042 p<0.001 
       
Site E -546.780 80.190 p<0.001 -820.441 79.163 p<0.001 
Wind -0.054 0.026 0.038 0.015 0.026 0.56 
Year 0.274 0.040 p<0.001 0.410 0.040 p<0.001 
After vs before -0.548 0.181 0.003 -0.936 0.181 p<0.001 
Jan 1.218 0.328 p<0.001 1.077 0.331 0.001 
Feb 1.089 0.331 0.001 0.774 0.333 0.02 
Mar 1.535 0.321 p<0.001 1.123 0.323 0.001 
Apr 0.779 0.348 0.025 0.417 0.350 0.233 
May 0.161 0.382 0.674 -0.428 0.383 0.264 
Jun 1.305 0.333 p<0.001 0.877 0.335 0.009 
Aug -0.607 0.491 0.216 -0.236 0.494 0.633 
Sept -0.175 0.446 0.695 0.232 0.449 0.605 
Oct 0.140 0.362 0.699 0.163 0.365 0.656 
Nov 0.429 0.344 0.212 0.347 0.346 0.316 
Dec 1.296 0.330 p<0.001 1.313 0.334 p<0.001 
Number aboard 
during a given 
trip 
1.339 0.082 p<0.001 1.323 0.083 p<0.001 
Boat active years 0.218 0.038 p<0.001 0.249 0.038 p<0.001 
Boat trips per 
active year 
0.117 0.005 p<0.001 0.113 0.005 p<0.001 
Boat max aboard 0.517 0.032 p<0.001 0.519 0.032 p<0.001 
Boat average 
aboard 
-2.491 0.095 p<0.001 -2.568 0.095 p<0.001 
Year 2000 0.448 0.371 0.227 -0.153 0.367 0.677 
Boat active years 
x Year 2000 
-0.125 0.055 0.024 -0.072 0.054 0.188 
       
Site X 451.031 93.312 p<0.001 164.7644   91.37337 0.071 
Wind 0.013 0.022 0.556 0.052 0.022 0.018 
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Year -0.225 0.047 p<0.001 -0.082 0.046 0.072 
After vs before 0.931 0.228 p<0.001 0.542 0.229 0.018 
Jan -17.914 696.567 0.979 -19.563 1399.989 0.989 
Feb -3.359 0.520 p<0.001 -3.756 0.522 p<0.001 
Mar -4.851 1.010 p<0.001 -5.307 1.010 p<0.001 
Apr -3.990 0.721 p<0.001 -4.416 0.721 p<0.001 
May -1.139 0.216 p<0.001 -1.758 0.218 p<0.001 
Jun 0.665 0.152 p<0.001 0.239 0.154 0.12 
Aug -1.216 0.237 p<0.001 -0.884 0.243 p<0.001 
Sept -1.225 0.256 p<0.001 -0.870 0.261 0.001 
Oct -3.370 0.523 p<0.001 -3.447 0.526 p<0.001 
Nov -18.095 716.690 0.98 -19.671 1420.798 0.989 
Dec -18.017 719.053 0.98 -19.594 1507.553 0.99 
Number aboard 
during a given 
trip 
1.433 0.078 p<0.001 1.437 0.079 p<0.001 
Boat active years 0.267 0.043 p<0.001 0.315 0.043 p<0.001 
Boat trips per 
active year 
0.103 0.006 p<0.001 0.099 0.006 p<0.001 
Boat max aboard 0.513 0.035 p<0.001 0.508 0.035 p<0.001 
Boat average 
aboard 
-2.429 0.104 p<0.001 -2.518 0.104 p<0.001 
Year 2000 0.285 0.362 0.431 -0.208 0.355 0.558 
Boat active years 
x Year 2000 
-0.157 0.057 0.006 -0.127 0.056 0.024 
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Table 4-3. Robustness of travel cost coefficients estimated over  the two no-trip datasets 
split into data before and after a marine reserve was implemented at SPMI 
Dataset A: no trip choices drawn from all days 
Dataset B: no trip choices drawn 
from days any boat in the fleet took 
a fishing trip 
Model fit to trips after reserve implemented 
  
Log Likelihood= Pseudo R2= 
 
Log 
Likelihood= Pseudo R2= 
-7896.42 
 
0.339 
  
-7969.117 
 
0.324 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
 
       Travel cost 
divided by 
number aboard 
-0.307 0.073 
p<0.001 
 
-0.303 0.074 
p<0.001 
Squared 0.006 0.002 0.005 
 
0.006 0.002 0.006 
Cubed -4.83E-05 0.000 0.062 
 
-4.88E-05 0.000 0.065 
Travel cost x 
Wind 
-0.004 0.002 0.026 
  
-0.004 0.002 0.015 
    
 
   
Model fit to trips before reserve implemented 
   
Log Likelihood= Pseudo R2= 
 
Log 
Likelihood= Pseudo R2= 
-11296.3 
 
0.376 
  
-11969.13 
 
0.36 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
 
       Travel cost 
divided by 
number aboard -0.389 0.064 p<0.001 
 
-0.420 0.066 p<0.001 
Squared 0.007 0.002 0.001 
 
0.008 0.002 0.001 
Cubed -6.08E-05 0.000 0.028 
 
-5.72E-05 0.000 0.041 
Travel cost x 
Wind -0.002 0.002 0.242   -0.004 0.002 0.038 
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Table 4-4. The proportion of trips that go to each site before (A) and after (C) the reserve 
is instituted. (B) uses a model of angler behavior in the ‗before‘ reserve period, to project 
site choices using data from the ‗after‘ reserve period.  
 
 
(A) (B) (C) 
 
Actual: 
Proportional 
visits  
“before” 
reserve 
Expected: Projected 
proportional visits to each 
site,  Using behavior from 
'before' to project site 
choice on 'after' data 
Actual: 
Proportional 
visits  “after” 
reserve 
  
(95% Projection Intervals) 
 
    
    
SPMI 0.053861 0.1261637 0.089232 
  
(0.124, 0.128) 
 
Site T 0.292873 0.1535451 0.262906 
  
(0.152, 0.155) 
 
Site F 0.076934 0.0322247 0.056294 
  
(0.031, 0.033) 
 
Site X 0.016491 0.009596 0.020122 
  
(0.009, 0.010) 
 
Site W 0.035105 0.1061317 0.044436 
  
(0.105, 0.108) 
 
Site E 0.020242 0.0760535 0.034615 
  
(0.075, 0.077) 
 
No 
Trip 
0.504494 0.4962854 0.492394 
  
(0.491, 0.501) 
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Figure 4-5. A comparison of the projected expected number of visits to SPMI compared 
to the actual number of visits to SPMI observed in the years from 2005-2008. Dollar 
amounts are the necessary cost increase to travel to SPMI that would move the expected 
value to the observed level; this is an estimate of the extra ‗cost‘ expected by anglers 
traveling to SPMI.  
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Figure 4-6. Plot of increasing fine amounts ($US) per boat and the corresponding changes 
in number of visits that go to SPMI, the site with a marine reserve. Shown are 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
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4.6 Discussion 
The ‗expected‘ visits to SPMI as modeled were higher than the observed visits.  
By modeling an increase in cost to visit SPMI, I was able to discern the necessary cost to 
bring ‗expected‘ levels of visitation down to ‗observed‘ levels. The year following the 
implementation of the reserve (2006) Anglers reduced their visits as if there was an added 
expected cost of $18 for visiting the reserve (Figure 5).  If the difference between 
observed and expected visitation were entirely due to the reserve, this is the expected 
increased cost of a site visit experienced by the anglers for closing valuable fishing 
grounds at SPMI. Figure 5 shows the breakdown of actual and expected levels of 
visitation, and additional costs expected by anglers to visit SPMI each year. The costs 
expected went down over time, and the pattern is consistent with findings that the reserve 
had a brief but not lasting effect on angler behavior (Fujitani et al. 2012). I calculate that 
an expected fine of about $400 (Figure 6) would eliminate recreational fishing day trips 
to SPMI altogether. The data this fine is generated from comes from a system where there 
are legal fishing opportunities at SPMI. Thus, given those legal fishing opportunities, the 
data suggest that if the cost per boat to visit SPMI increased by $400 dollars, no one 
would choose to travel there to fish. This is likely an upper bound on a fine to enforce the 
actual no-take reserve, but for streamlining of analysis and narrative here I will treat it as 
a fine to completely exclude fishing from the island.   Given that the modeled level of 
fine to ensure no boats visit the reserve is around $400 (Figure 6), I back out a perceived 
probability of getting caught (Becker 1968) if anglers behaved as if the experienced an 
expected cost of $18; it is 0.045. This is higher than the realized probability of being 
caught and fined, which was operationally zero (Fujitani et al. 2012).   
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If the perceived level of enforcement were 0.045, the necessary posted fine to 
exclude visits from SPMI would be over $8,000. A fine of this magnitude is in line with 
current posted fines for terrestrial and aquatic poaching in the US under Title 16 USC and 
local laws. This is appropriate given that the recreational anglers are predominantly US 
citizens, and many of them also hunt and fish in the US during the summer. Penalties for 
poaching in US parks range from misdemeanor charges with a maximum $5,000 fine and 
six months in jail for each charge, to invocation of the Lacey Act when poached species 
have a commercial value above $350 dollars resulting in felony charges with a maximum 
$20,000 fine and five years per count.  The perceived or even actual rate of enforcement 
of these laws given these posted fines is unknowable, as I have no statistics on undetected 
poaching.  The Merritt Island reserve in Florida has a no-take zone as a restricted area 
enforced by NASA (http://www.fws.gov/merrittisland/FishRegs2012.pdf).  The level of 
protection in Merritt Island led to a successful reserve by all metrics (Roberts et al. 2001), 
and one might assume that anglers perceived a high level of enforcement. Trespassing 
into a NASA restricted area punishable by up to $5,000 and a year in jail (18 U.S.C. 799). 
Fines are summarized in Table 5.  There was never an official fine posted to protect the 
SPMI reserve. Reserve managers announced that the reserve would be enforced, 
potentially by fines, boat impoundment, or incarceration. Though fishing in the no-take 
zone was observed after the announcement of enforcement (Meza et al. 2008) no 
penalties were ever enforced.   
Beyond the discussion of a level of effective fine is the important discussion of 
whether such a fine can be implemented. A fine in the thousands of dollars may be 
standard in the US, but, in the period between 2000-2008, the daily minimum wage in 
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that region of Mexico was less than 50 pesos (www.conasami.gob.mx), a little over 5 
USD.  This raises the issue of socio-economic equity. SPMI is fished by small-scale 
artisanal Mexican fishers in addition to recreational anglers. A fine of $8,000, a hefty 
deterrent for some, would be an impossible financial burden for others.  Further, 
enforcement is not free. If managerial capacity for enforcement is low, one option is to 
proportionally increase the fine, as increasing the fine incurs no additional operational 
costs to management (Eide et al. 2006). The fine could be raised such that the perceived 
fine (posted fine x perceived probability of being caught; Becker 1968) remains around 
$400. Enforcement did not occur during the time series at SPMI, and while the initial 
expected increase in cost to fishers was $16, the expected cost dropped over time (Figure 
5). The overall increase in expected cost of fishing at SPMI using data from the entire 
recorded post-reserve period 2005-2008 was $7.50 due to the reduction in expected costs. 
Given the expected cost of $7.50, fishers appeared to assume a very small but non-zero 
probability of being caught (0.019), and necessary posted fine with such a low probability 
of being caught is over $21,000 -- an unworkable amount. Polinsky and Shavell (1991) 
showed that increasing a fine beyond the wealth of the prospective lawbreakers did not 
increase deterrence, and that if fines are increased in order to decrease enforcement, 
while high-wealth individuals will have increased deterrence, low-wealth individuals will 
actually be deterred less from committing infractions. 
Enforcement of reserve rules are necessary to avoid ―paper reserves,‖ with 
regulations that exist only on the pages of the management plan. Initial enforcement is 
essential to reserve success, as in the case of SPMI (Fujitani et al. 2012); and strong 
enforcement in the beginning of reserve establishment can have the greatest long-term 
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effect on behavior and benefits to management goals (Byers and Noonburg 2007). To 
preserve social acceptability of the reserve, enforcement must be unbiased and even-
handed (Shindler et al. 2002; Allendorf 2007). As outlined above, regular, more frequent 
enforcement leads potential lawbreakers to perceive a higher probability of being caught; 
this could allow a lower fine amount to be posted, also contributing to social acceptability 
of regulations. Fines and enforcement may not be perfect substitutes, as theory suggests. 
One empirical study of fisheries law enforcement found that violations are most sensitive 
to increases in the likelihood of detection rather than fine increases (Furlong 1991). There 
is also the issue of corruption, where a lawbreaker can avoid a larger fine by paying 
enforcement agents a smaller bribe. Such corruption can be widespread in protected 
areas, particularly those with weak institutional structures (Infield and Agrippinah 2001, 
Allendorf et al. 2006; 2007). Not only does corruption reduce the ability to protect 
resources and meet biological goals, it also adversely affects the social acceptability of 
regulations and public perceptions of management as knowledge of corruption becomes 
widespread (Infield and Agrippinah 2001, Allendorf et al. 2007). Strong institutions are 
necessary for reserves to function as intended.   
The data provide a way to have a discussion about biological efficacy, social and 
cultural acceptability, economic equity, and management capacity. Due to the logit model 
specification and the functional form of the utility function, the plot of the projected 
number of fishing trips going to SPMI given different fines has a non-linear trend (Figure 
6). Further, the distribution of errors in the logit model is specified type 1 extreme value, 
with fatter tails allowing for more extreme observations. Because the maximum fines to 
exclude visits altogether are found in the tails, I constructed non-parametric bootstrapped 
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confidence intervals (Figure 6). There are diminishing returns to increasing the expected 
level of fine over around $100 dollars.  By imposing a fine (with absolute enforcement) 
of $40, trips to the SPMI can be reduced by half; with a $100 fine there would be a three-
quarters reduction in fishing trips to SPMI.  It is never optimal to completely eliminate 
trips to the reserve; theory indicates and these results suggest that is becomes too costly 
(Becker 1968; Bulte and van Kooten 1999; Sutinen and Andersen 1985). Further, fines 
collected from enforcement could potentially be used to fund further enforcement (Bulte 
and van Kooten 1999). A reduction in fishing visits will reduce fishing pressure, and 
reduction versus elimination may be enough to meet the biological goals of a reserve. 
Further, opposition or support for the reserve can change over time, with economic or 
political circumstances, or if the reserve is expected to be effective at supplementing 
fisheries through spillover (Smith et al. 2010). For effective reserve management given 
limited resources for enforcement, the posted fine can be elevated to match 
management‘s ability to provide an environment with a given probability of being caught 
and fined. The level of fine and enforcement can be adjusted to trade off biological goals 
of reducing fishing pressure with social justice and political acceptability. This informed 
discussion and decision-making is only possible given some knowledge of how users are 
expected to respond to fines. 
Using information on angler behavior, I was able to determine the relevant fine 
structure to aid management in determining a level of fine and enforcement that would be 
effective in reducing recreational angler visits to the reserve a set amount.  This alleviates 
some uncertainty from the management process, and provides a data-driven (as opposed 
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to arbitrary) framework for designing a fine and enforcement regimen for a marine 
reserve.   
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Table 4-5. A summary of U.S. laws and penalties for violations, compared to the 
calculated fine to eliminate visits to SPMI. 
Restricted Activity Posted Penalty 
  
Calculated fine to eliminate visits to SPMI $8000 per boat per violation 
   
Misdemeanor poaching in a US park Maximum $5,000 fine and six months in 
jail for each charge 
   
Felony poaching protected species (Lacey Act) Maximum $20,000 fine and five years per 
count 
   
Trespassing in a NASA restricted area  
(Merritt Island Marine Reserve) 
Maximum $5,000 and a year in jail 
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APPENDIX A 
 PARAMETERS USED IN BIO-ECONOMIC MODELING IN CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 
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Parameters used in bio-economic modeling in Chapters 1 and 2 
 
Biological Parameters   
Carrying Capacity 10 
Intrinsic Growith Rate 0.4 
  Economic Parameters   
Catchability 0.3 
Opportunity Cost 3 
Price 25 
Entry rate 0.0055 
Movement between 
patches 0.0004 
 
  
